The Effect of Disability on Subjective Well-Being across the Adult Lifespan: The Moderating Roles of Age at Disability Onset and Disability Type by Fraire, Nicoletta (Author) et al.
 
The Effect of Disability on Subjective Well-Being across the Adult Lifespan: The 
 
Moderating Roles of Age at Disability Onset and Disability Type 
 
by 
 
Nicoletta Fraire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Master of Arts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved April 2019 by the 
Graduate Supervisory Committee: 
 
Frank Infurna, Chair 
Suniya Luthar 
Kevin Grimm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY 
 
December 2019 
ABSTRACT 
 
The present study aimed to advance the current understanding of the relation 
between disability and subjective well-being by examining the extent to which different 
facets of subjective well-being (life satisfaction, positive affect, and negative affect) 
change before and after disability onset, and the extent to which age and type of 
disability moderate such changes. Multiphase growth-curve models to prospective 
longitudinal survey data from Waves 1-16 of the Household, Income and Labour 
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey (N = 3,795; mean age = 50.22; age range: 16-99; 
51% women). On average, life satisfaction remained relatively stable across the disability 
transition, whereas positive affect declined and negative affect increased the year 
surrounding disability onset; in the years thereafter, neither positive affect nor negative 
affect returned to pre-onset levels. Individuals who acquired disability in old age were 
more likely to report sustained declines in subjective well-being than were individuals 
who became disabled in midlife or young adulthood. Psychological disability was 
associated with the strongest declines across each indicator of subjective well-being at 
disability onset but also greater adaptation in the years thereafter. The findings provide 
further evidence against the set-point theory of hedonic adaptation and for a more 
moderate viewpoint that allows for processes of adaptation to vary based on the outcome 
examined, the type of stressor, and individual characteristics. The discussion focuses on 
possible mechanisms underlying the moderating roles of age and type of disability. 
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vi 
The Effect of Disability on Subjective Well-Being across the Adult Lifespan: The 
 
Moderating Roles of Age at Disability Onset and Disability Type 
Subjective well-being (SWB) is both an indicator of life adjustment and a 
 
predictor of performance across multiple life domains. High SWB is consistently found 
to be positively associated with later academic and professional success, financial 
prosperity, healthy interpersonal relationships, and even optimal mental and physical 
 
health (Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 2005).1 Conversely, low SWB is reliably found to 
predict poor outcomes in these life domains (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005). For this reasons, 
studying subjective well-being—and the factors that influence it—is important not only 
from a theoretical perspective but also from an applied perspective. Knowledge derived 
from research on SWB can be used to determine and promote societal health and 
welfare, either for intrinsic reasons—because societal well-being is valued for its own 
sake—or for extrinsic reasons, as a means to engender additional positive outcomes, such 
as economic prosperity (Dolan & Metcalfe, 2012; Kahneman & Krueger, 2006; Layard, 
2006; Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2010). 
 
A review of the literature reveals that empirical research on SWB has been 
vigorously pursued over the last 15 years, despite lingering historical skepticism on the 
very possibility that SWB is susceptible to change (see Yap, Anusic, & Lucas, 2014, for 
a discussion of such skepticism). However, this research has been rather limited in scope. 
Studies have focused on age-related changes in SWB (e.g., Baird, Lucas, & Donnellan, 
2010; Cheng, Powdthavee, & Oswald, 2017) or on the impact on SWB of relatively 
 
 
1
 This association is explained by the fact that high SWB is also consistently shown to engender the 
characteristics that tend to accompany success, such as productivity and sociability (Lyubomirsky, King, 
& Diener, 2005). 
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normative life events, such as marriage, divorce, spousal loss, childbirth, unemployment, 
retirement, and migration and relocation (Luhmann, Hofman, Eid, & Lucas, 2012). Only 
a handful of studies has investigated (prospectively) how disability affects SWB (e.g., 
Infurna and Wiest, 2016; Lucas, 2007). 
 
Moreover, such studies have stopped short of examining different dimensions of 
SWB, focusing on either life satisfaction (the cognitive aspect of SWB) or on 
psychological distress (a measure of the affective component of SWB), but not on both 
simultaneously. They have also tended to stop short of examining potential moderators 
of the relation between disability and SWB; and when they have examined moderators, 
the focus has been on severity of disability. Thus, very little is known regarding how age 
at disability onset and type of disability might attenuate or exacerbate the effect of 
disability on SWB. 
 
This study addresses these limitations by investigating the relation between 
disability and subjective well-being across different measures of SWB (i.e., life 
satisfaction, positive affect, and negative affect) and by examining whether age at 
disability onset and type of disability have a moderating effect on this relation. 
 
Disability 
 
Definition. Theoretical accounts of disability, such as the Disablement Process 
Model (Verbrugge & Jette, 1994), define disability as an experience characterized by lasting 
restrictions or lack of ability to perform activities of daily living due to a physical 
or mental functional impairment.2 This is a broad definition that both reflects and has led 
 
 
 
 
2
 This does not imply that conceptual models of disability are necessarily purely medical models. On the 
contrary, many of them, including the Disablement Process Model, which remains at the forefront of 
2 
 
to an array of operationalizations. Specifically, it is has led to efforts designed, in large 
part, to remove the ambiguity in the meaning of terms such as “lasting,” “restrictions,” 
and “activities of daily living.” Indeed, how long should a person experience activity 
limitations before he or she can be said to have disability? What specific kind and degree 
of activity limitations should be classified as markers of disability? And what criteria 
define optimal cutoffs between mild, moderate, and severe disability? 
 
To date, there is no consensus among researchers on some of these (and similar) 
issues. A review of the empirical literature examining the relation between disability and 
subjective well-being reveals substantial inconsistency in the way disability is 
operationally defined. For example, some studies have relied on surveys asking 
participants whether they have difficulty carrying out Basic and Instrumental Activities 
of Daily Living (BADLs and IADLs, respectively)—i.e., self-care tasks such as bathing 
and toileting (BADLs) and routine activities necessary for maintaining a household, such 
as managing finances and doing house or yard work (IADLs). Other studies have 
analyzed responses to questionnaires inquiring about participants’ ability to perform 
everyday tasks required of their job (i.e., work-activity limitations). Similarly, some 
surveys (e.g., the German Socio-Economic Panel) ask participants whether they have 
been “officially certified” as having a disability, whereas others (e.g., the Household, 
Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia) ask respondents to report on their disability 
status based solely on their own assessment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
guiding research on disability (Guralnik & Ferrucci, 2009), do recognize the influence of environmental 
factors in, if not causing, then certainly alleviating, maintaining, or aggravating disability. 
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Although the adoption of different operational definitions by different researchers 
can offer convergent validity to the construct of disability, it can also limit the ability to 
compare results across studies. Slight variations in the operationalization of disability in 
survey questions can result in large discrepancies in disability prevalence estimates, 
which, in turn, can lead to substantial differences in empirical findings and conclusions 
(see Francescutti, Battisti, Griffo, & Solipaca, 2017, for examples of the impact of 
different operational definitions of disability on the SWB variability). 
 
Significance of Studying Disability. Although disability is a relatively non-
normative life experience, especially among young adults, it affects more than one billion 
people worldwide (or approximately 15% of the world population), according to the 
recent World Report on Disability jointly produced by the World Health Organization 
and the World Bank (Officer & Posarac, 2011). Moreover, this percentage has been on 
the rise and is projected to continue to increase steadily, for two basic reasons. First, the 
risk and incidence of disability is highest in old age and the world population is aging 
rapidly. Second, there is a global rise in prevalence of disabling conditions, such as 
diabetes, cardiovascular disease, cancer, obesity, and mental health disorders (Officer & 
Posarac, 2011; Seeman, Merkin, Crimmins, & Karlamangla, 2010). Due to advances in 
medical treatment and the use of assistive technology, the number of people dying from 
such conditions is decreasing compared to the number of people living with them. In 
other words, more people are living longer but with emergent disabilities. 
 
Additionally, research on disability time trends in different types of disability 
(including limitations in BADLs, IADLs, and mobility- and functional-related activities 
such as walking, standing, and lifting or carrying weights) does not indicate improvement 
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over time for most age groups. In fact, with the exception of the oldest-old (aged >80 
years), who have shown evidence of declines in mobility- and functional-related activity 
limitations (e.g., Seeman et al., 2010), no age group has displayed a trend toward less 
prevalence of various types of disability over the past two decades (Crimmins, 2015). 
Prevalence of limitations in BADLs and IADLs (as well as in mobility- and functional-
related activities for all but the oldest-old) has remained stable for the oldest-old (e.g., 
Seeman et al., 2010) and even increased—often substantially so—for the younger old 
(aged 60-79 years) (e.g., Seeman et al., 2010) and for people in midlife (aged 40-59 
years) and in young adulthood (aged 18-39 years) (Bhattacharya et al., 2008; Christensen, 
Doblhammer, Rau, & Vaupel, 2009; Crimmins, 2015; Freedman et al., 2013; Martin & 
Schoeni, 2014). 
 
Subjective Well-Being 
 
Subjective well-being (SWB) refers broadly to “people’s emotional and 
cognitive evaluations of their life” (Diener, Oishi, & Lucas, 2003). Accordingly, its 
assessment typically has involved measuring three distinct (but interrelated) constructs: 
life satisfaction, positive affect, and negative affect. Life satisfaction reflects the 
cognitive-evaluative component of SWB; it is measured with questions designed to elicit 
global assessments of one’s life in relation to some standard, such as a peer group or 
one’s own envisioned ideal life. Positive affect and negative affect reflect the emotional-
evaluative dimension of SWB; they are measured with questions designed to tap into 
pleasant and unpleasant emotions people experience while carrying out daily activities. 
To the extent that a person reports high satisfaction with his or her life, a high level of 
positive affect, and a low level of negative affect, he or she is said to be high in SWB. 
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Some researchers (e.g., Ryff, 1989, 1995; Ryff & Singer, 2008; Waterman, 
Schwartz, & Conti, 2008) contend that SWB does not necessarily equate with 
psychological well-being, arguing that the latter consists of more than just cognitive 
and affective (or hedonic) elements. Specifically, they conceptualize psychological 
well-being as including eudaimonic elements, such as self-acceptance and purpose in 
life, derived from notions of maturity, as Allport intended it, or actualization of one’s 
human potentials, à la Maslow. Nevertheless, SWB is widely considered as a valid (and 
robust) indicator of life adjustment, as evidenced by the vigor with which it is 
researched across countries and across disciplines, from psychology to economics to 
political science to gerontology. 
 
Subjective Well-Being across the Adult Lifespan 
 
Theories of lifespan development, such as the Model of Selective Optimization 
with Compensation (SOC; Baltes & Baltes, 1990), Heckhausen and Schultz’s (1995) 
lifespan theory of control, and Socioemotional Selectivity Theory (SST; Carstensen, 
Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999), suggest that subjective well-being should increase as age 
increases. For example, the SOC model posits that, at each stage of the lifespan, 
successful human development depends on maximizing gains and minimizing losses 
through the orchestrated use of three fundamental sets of self-regulatory strategies: 
selection, optimization, and compensation. Selection refers to the setting of and 
commitment to goals, based on personal preferences (elective selection) or in response 
to perceived loss of internal or contextual resources (loss-based selection). Optimization 
involves the use of effective means to pursue selected goals. Compensation refers to the 
use of alternative means to substitute lost means (Baltes & Baltes, 1990). 
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As individuals age and accumulate life experiences, their knowledge, preference 
for, and adeptness in the use of these strategies are expected to increasingly grow (Baltes 
 
& Baltes, 1990; Freund & Baltes, 2002). 3 Accordingly, the older the individual is, 
the more likely he/she should be to report high scores in indicators of successful 
development (or, life adjustment), such as SWB (Freund & Baltes, 2002). 
 
In a similar vein, Socioemotional Selectivity Theory (SST; Carstensen et al., 
1999) proposes that, as people age and near death, they become increasingly more aware 
of their mortality. This increasingly limited time perspective, in turn, causes a 
motivational shift away from future-oriented goals aimed at expanding horizons and 
toward present-oriented goals aimed at emotional contentment (Carstensen et al., 1999; 
Carstensen, 2006). In other words, individuals become less and less interested in pursuing 
activities that are expected to pay off in the future (e.g., career planning and development 
of social networks) and increasingly more motivated to prioritize endeavors whose 
benefits can be realized in the here-and-now and that are emotionally gratifying (e.g., 
cultivating existing relationships). Accordingly, as age advances, life satisfaction and 
day-to-day emotional well-being should increase (Charles & Carstensen, 2009). 
 
Lifespan developmental research focusing on changes in life satisfaction, positive 
affect, and negative affect, however, does not support this contention. Cross-sectional 
and longitudinal studies alike have shown that life satisfaction and positive affect remain 
 
 
 
3
 To be fair, in regards to late adulthood, two alternative hypotheses have been formulated (Freund & 
Baltes, 2002). One, based on the original formulation of the SOC model by Baltes and Baltes (1990), is that 
older adults continue to become better at the use of SOC strategies, because of accumulated life 
experiences (Baltes & Baltes, 1990). The second, based on empirical findings that followed Baltes & Baltes 
(1990), is that the use of SOC strategies may, in fact, decline in late adulthood due to aging-related losses 
in resources and the related fact that the use of SOC strategies is itself resource-dependent (Freund & 
Baltes, 2002).  
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relatively stable through about age 60 and then begin to decline (e.g., Baird et al., 
2010; Charles, Reynold, & Gatz, 2001; Gana, Saada, & Amieva, 2015; Kunzmann, 
2008; Mroczek & Spiro, 2005). Similarly, negative affect shows reasonable stability 
throughout early and mid-adulthood followed by progressive increases over time in old 
age (Hansen, & Slagsvold, 2012; Vogel, Schilling, Wahl, Beekman, & Penninx, 2013). 
Contrary to the predictions of theoretical models, these results have led researchers to 
equate advanced age with lessened rather than increased subjective well-being. 
 
That said, research has also revealed substantial differences in levels of, and rate 
and direction of changes in, SWB among same-age individuals. For example, despite the 
average negative changes in SWB in late life, not all older adults experience increases in 
negative affect or declines in life satisfaction and positive affect over time (e.g., Charles 
et al., 2001). Similarly, despite the average stability of life satisfaction, positive affect, 
and negative affect throughout early and mid-adulthood, many young and mid-adults 
show significant and sustained changes in measures of SWB (e.g., Mroczek & Spiro, 
2005). 
 
The existence of such between-person differences suggests that declines in SWB 
in late life might not be attributable to advanced age. Instead, it is plausible that non-age-
related pathological processes might be the driving force underlying such declines 
(Fauth, Gerstorf, Ram, & Malmberg, 2014; Kunzmann, Little, & Smith, 2000). The same 
processes, such as the disablement process, also might explain differences in SWB 
among same-age younger adults. For this reason, changes in SWB across the adult 
lifespan might not be best tracked along a chronological age (i.e., time-from-birth) time 
 
 
8 
metric, but rather over time metrics that proxy the disablement process, such as a time- 
 
to/from-disability onset. 
 
Research Suggesting a Link between Subjective Well-Being and Disability 
 
Theoretical research. Several theories suggest a link between SWB and 
disability-related processes and events. These include theories of lifespan 
development, gerontological theories of aging, and theoretical accounts of disability. 
 
Theories of lifespan development. Lifespan developmental psychologists have 
long regarded the life course as a multidimensional process. For example, Baltes, Reese, 
and Lipsitt (1980), in their influential tri-factor model, identified three sets of interrelated 
influences driving development at any given time during the life course: age-related 
influences, history-related influences, and non-normative influences. Age-related 
influences are experiences (e.g., puberty, menopause, retirement) that correlate strongly 
with age and are, therefore, predictable in terms of when they occur and how long they 
last, at least within the same culture. History-related influences (e.g., wars, epidemics) 
are associated with a specific time period; they are normative in that they are experienced 
by the majority of the population during a given time period. Non-normative influences 
refer to life events (e.g., a lottery win, a car accident, the death of a child) whose 
occurrence, patterning, and sequencing are unique to a minority of the population. 
Disability, especially among young adults, falls within the category of non-normative 
(negative) life events that can (negatively) influence development, and thus affect 
indicators of (successful) development, such as SWB. 
 
Gerontological theories of aging. Similarly, gerontological theories of aging have 
long postulated that late life is not a unitary process, driven only by age-related forces; 
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rather, it is a dynamic combination of both age- and non-age-related processes. As early 
as 1969, Busse made a conceptual distinction between primary and secondary aging. 
Primary aging refers to the gradual—and ultimately inevitable—changes (e.g., fading 
vision, impaired hearing, slowed movements, decreased resistance to infections) that 
correlate with chronological age and are caused by age-related physical deterioration. 
Secondary (or atypical, pathological) aging refers to changes caused by illnesses that 
correlate with age but are preventable, modifiable, and potentially reversible (Busse, 
1969). Later, a third distinction was added, termed “tertiary aging,” which refers to 
precipitous changes that occur shortly (months, perhaps years) before death; they are 
less correlated with age than they are with approaching death (Birren and Cunningham, 
1985). Disability-related processes represent the quintessence of secondary aging 
processes that drive development—thus affecting indicators of life adjustment—in late 
life. 
 
Theoretical accounts of disability. In a similar vein, theoretical accounts of 
disability, such as the Disablement Process Model (Verbrugge & Jette, 1994), recognize 
that disability can have dire consequences for the individual affected, including sustained 
negative effects on his or her perceived sense of well-being. Specifically, the 
Disablement Process Model, which remains at the forefront of guiding research on 
disability (Guralnik & Ferrucci, 2009), conceptualizes disability as the outcome of an 
inherently dynamic, preventable, modifiable, and potentially reversible process that may 
be described as a progression from pathology (e.g., arthritis) to impairment (e.g., joint 
stiffness and pain) to functional limitation (e.g., difficulty bending) and finally disability. 
Disability refers to experiencing difficulty carrying out activities of daily living (e.g., 
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everyday tasks required of one’s job, everyday self-care tasks such as bathing and 
toileting, and routine activities necessary for maintaining a household, such as managing 
finances and doing house or yard work). Because such activities are essential for 
independence and social participation, disability acts as a major life stressor and, as 
such, can have profound negative effects on one’s perceived sense of well-being. 
 
Empirical Research. Since Brickman, Coates, and Janoff-Bulman (1978) 
(in)famously reported finding that paraplegics and quadriplegics are not that much 
unhappier than lottery winners, there has been an ongoing debate in the disability 
literature regarding whether and to what extent persons with disability are able to 
psychologically adapt to their condition. Two main positions have emerged from this 
debate. One is the position of scholars who fully embrace the counterintuitive idea, put 
forth by Brickman and colleagues (1978), that people with disability are not nearly as 
miserable as one might expect—or, that disability does not lead to substantial and 
sustained declines in SWB (e.g., Albrecht & Devlieger, 1999; Amundson, 2010; Riis et 
al., 2005). These scholars typically emphasize empirical findings showing that many, if 
not most, people with disability report surprisingly high levels of quality of life and 
other measures of psychological well-being, and tend to explain this phenomenon (often 
 
referred to as “the disability paradox”)
4
 with theories of “hedonic adaptation” (also known as 
“set-point theories”). Hedonic adaptation refers to the idea that individuals may experience 
temporary increases or decreases in well-being following a change in their life 
 
 
 
 
 
4
 But cf. Koch (2000), who criticizes the notion of “disability paradox” (calling it “illusion of 
paradox”) pointing out the circular thinking that underlies it. 
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circumstances, but they will reliably, and quickly, return to their baseline (or set-point) 
happiness levels (Brickman and Campbell, 1971). 
 
The other position is represented by researchers who remain skeptical of such idea 
(e.g., Freedman, Stafford, Schwarz, Conrad, & Cornman, 2012; Infurna and Wiest, 2016; 
Lucas, 2007). These researchers argue that a close examination of the literature reveals 
no evidence that psychological adaptation to disability is ubiquitous or that its effects are 
as strong as they are claimed to be. For example, Diener, Suh, Lucas, and Smith (1999) 
pointed out that Mehnert, Krauss, Nadler, and Boyd’s (1990) claim that “it is 
unwarranted to assume lower levels of life satisfaction, relative to the general population, 
for those with disabling conditions” is itself unwarranted. Although the study revealed 
that 68% of individuals with disabling conditions said they were somewhat or very 
satisfied with their lives, the percentage of individuals without disabling conditions who 
reported comparable levels of life satisfaction was much higher (90%). Furthermore, 
those with multiple disabling conditions were found to be less satisfied than those with a 
single condition. Similarly, Post and Van Leeuwen (2012), after reviewing the results of 
more than a dozen studies examining life satisfaction in samples of spinal-cord-injury 
(SCI) survivors, came to the following conclusion: “It thus appears that life satisfaction 
improves from an initial level early after SCI, but only to a level substantially below that 
of the general population” (p. 383). 
 
It is worth noting that most of the research informing this debate does not allow 
the drawing of reliable conclusions regarding how disability might affect SWB (Anusic, 
Yap, & Lucas, 2014; Lucas, 2007). First, the majority of these studies are cross-
sectional in design and limited to relatively small samples of individuals with particular 
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disabilities, such as spinal-cord-injury-related (Post & Van Leeuwen, 2012), amputation-
related (Horgan & McLachlan, 2004), stroke-related (e.g., Clarke & Black, 2005), and 
intellectual (e.g., Emerson & Hatton, 2008) disabilities. Second, the fewer studies that are 
not cross-sectional tend to analyze longitudinal data that were collected only after 
disability onset (e.g., Hoffman, Bombardier, Graves, Kalpakjian, & Krause, 2011). 
Disability is not a completely exogenous event; thus, failure to measure pre-disability 
levels of SWB prevents scholars from ruling out the possibility that observed between-
and within-person differences in SWB following disability onset are due to pre-existing 
differences in SWB. In other words, like cross-sectional studies, longitudinal studies that 
fail to measure pre-disability levels of SWB cannot provide convincing conclusions 
regarding disability effects on SWB, because they do not control for selection effects. 
Third, the even fewer studies that have analyzed longitudinal data collected both before 
and after disability onset have tended to rely on samples of individuals recruited because 
they were likely to acquire disability (e.g., Ormel, Rijsdijk, Sullivan, Van Sonderen, & 
Kempen, 2002). This recruitment strategy raises the concern that participants formed an 
interpretation of the study’s purpose and adjusted their responses accordingly—i.e., 
under- or over-rated their levels of SWB to fit what they believed to be the study’s 
purpose. Thus, studies that have employed such strategy do not allow for ruling out the 
possibility that demand characteristics might have affected the results. 
 
To address these limitations, researchers have turned to large-scale, nationally 
representative, longitudinal panel datasets to examine the impact of disability on SWB. 
This type of study offers several advantages over the types described above. First, 
participants are drawn from samples of individuals who were recruited randomly to be 
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representative of a national population—rather than because they had or were likely to 
acquire disability—and are asked questions about a wide variety of topics. Thus, the 
possibility that demand characteristics might influence responses is minimized. Second, 
participants are followed prospectively for an indefinite period (usually until death or 
study drop-out). This allows for (a) controlling for selection effects, because pre-
disability data are available and therefore post-disability SWB can be compared to pre-
disability SWB, and (b) examining both short- and long-term effects of disability, 
because data are collected, usually annually, for many years. Lastly, samples are large 
and allow more confidence to be placed in conclusions regarding changes in SWB before 
and after disability. 
 
The first researcher to take advantage of this type of dataset to examine the degree to 
which disability affects subjective well-being was Lucas (2007). Lucas (2007) conducted a 
two-study investigation using data drawn from the first 19 waves of the German 
Socioeconomic Panel (Study 1) and from the first 12 waves of the British Household Panel 
Survey (Study 2). Study 1 examined the short- and long-term effects of disability on life 
satisfaction. Study 2 replicated and extended Study 1 by examining disability-related changes 
in both life satisfaction and psychological distress (as measured with the General Health 
Questionnaire). In both studies, disability status was determined from a question asking 
participants if they were officially certified as being disabled. 
 
Results of multilevel models showed that participants’ life satisfaction decreased 
significantly following disability onset and never returned toward (let alone to) baseline. 
Conversely, participants’ psychological distress increased significantly in the year 
immediately following disability onset, compared to the 2 years immediately before; in 
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the succeeding years, it did rebound, but never completely. In fact, even after 5 years, it 
was still 0.47 standard deviations above baseline. Because these results held after 
controlling for income and employment status, Lucas (2007) interpreted them as evidence 
that disability leads to significant declines in subjective well-being, and thus (a) hedonic 
adaptation to disability is far from inevitable, and (b) if such adaptation occurs, it is 
minimal. 
 
Two subsequent studies supported this interpretation. Anusic et al. (2014) 
 
analyzed data drawn from 13 waves of the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) and found that 
the first year participants reported not being able to work due to disability, their life 
satisfaction dropped by 0.86 points (or 0.82 standard deviations), a statistically significant 
amount. By the fifth year following disability onset, life satisfaction levels had rebounded 
somewhat (by 0.48 points) but remained significantly lower than baseline levels (by 0.36 
standard deviations). Similarly, Infurna and Wiest (2016), using data drawn from the first 
28 waves of the German SOEP, found that participants’ life satisfaction declined in the 2 
years leading up to disability (anticipation), substantially dropped the first year 
participants reported being officially certified as having disability (reaction), and never 
returned to baseline (adaptation). In fact, 5 years after disability onset, life satisfaction 
was still significantly lower than it was the year immediately after onset. 
 
Several other studies, however, did not replicate these findings. Oswald and 
Powdthavee (2008), in their two-study investigation using data from the British HPS and 
the German SOEP, found that life satisfaction fell abruptly the year of disability onset, 
but then evidenced a rapid return toward pre-disability levels. Within two years of 
reporting being disabled, individuals who indicated having severe disability (i.e., being 
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unable to perform at least one ADL) had already recovered more than 30% of their 
losses in life satisfaction, and those who indicated having moderate disability (or, being 
able to perform ADLs) were halfway to full recovery (50% up from the initial drop). 
 
Powdthavee (2009), Pagán-Rodríguez (2010, 2012), and Braakmann (2014), using the 
same two datasets, found more or less similar results. Specifically, Powdthavee (2009), 
who analyzed data from 2,122 individuals drawn from nine waves of the BHPS, found 
that, after an initial significant decline coinciding with the year of disability onset, life 
satisfaction returned to baseline within 2 and 4 years for the moderately and the 
severely disabled individuals, respectively. 
 
Pagán-Rodríguez (2010), using data from 479 adult males aged 21-58 from the 
 
GSOEP found that life satisfaction declined slightly in the two years before participants 
 
first reported a reduced capacity to work due to disability, dropped by a significant 1 
 
point the year of disability onset, and then started to rise back up, reaching pre-disability 
 
levels 3 years later. In a subsequent study, Pagán-Rodríguez (2012) partially replicated 
 
these findings in a slightly larger sample again drawn from the GSOEP. Disability onset 
 
again was found to significantly reduce life satisfaction for adult males aged 21-58 
 
(reaction). However, the results showed (a) strong anticipation effects, with participants’ 
 
life satisfaction declining sharply starting 2 years before disability, and (b) full 
 
adaptation, but not before 4 years following disability onset. Lastly, Braakmann (2014), 
 
who also analyzed data from the GSOEP, found that disability had a significant negative 
 
impact on both men’s and women’s life satisfaction. He also found that, although neither 
 
men nor women adapted to the disability of their partner, they both partially adapted to 
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their own disability, in ways virtually identical to those reported by Oswald and 
Powdthavee (2008). 
 
To summarize, all researchers examining disability-related changes in SWB 
with data drawn from large-scale, nationally representative, longitudinal datasets found 
evidence of a significant decline in SWB following the onset of disability. However, 
results differed widely regarding adaptation effects, with one set of studies finding little 
to no evidence of partial (let alone complete) adaptation (Anusic et al., 2014; Infurna & 
Wiest, 2016; Lucas, 2007), and another finding that SWB reliably, and quickly, returns 
toward (if not to) baseline after its initial decline. The reasons for such discrepancy in 
results are unclear, as are the reasons for why adaptation was found to be complete in 
some studies and only partial in others, or for why Pagán-Rodríguez (2012) found 
evidence of anticipation effects whereas Pagán-Rodríguez (2010) and Infurna and Wiest 
(2016) did not. However, as others have pointed out (Powdthavee, 2009; Yap et al., 
 
2014), given that the majority of these studies utilize the same datasets, it is likely that 
discrepancies are, at least in part, the result of differences in methodology and 
analytical techniques. 
 
For example, there are notable differences in the criteria researchers used to 
include or exclude participants in their analytical samples. Oswald & Powdthavee (2008), 
Powdthavee (2009), Pagán-Rodríguez (2010, 2012) and Braakmann (2014) included in 
their analyses all respondents who reported acquiring disability at some point during the 
course of the study, including those whose disability was permanent and those who 
eventually recovered. In contrast, Lucas (2007), Anusic et al. (2014), and Infurna and 
Wiest (2016) excluded from their final analytical samples those individuals who reverted 
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to a non-disability state during the course of the study. Similarly, Lucas (2007), Anusic 
et al., (2014), and Infurna and Wiest (2016) used multilevel modeling techniques to 
analyze their data, instead of fitting fixed-effect models, whose estimates are only 
generalizable to the sample (not to the population of interest), as all other studies did. 
 
The Moderating Roles of Age at Disability Onset and Type of Disability 
 
While part of the reason for discrepancies in empirical findings is likely to be 
methodological in nature, another important explanation may lie in the fact that 
different people might respond differently to their disability, depending on a variety of 
intra- and extra-individual factors. 
 
This idea is implicitly articulated in the Disablement Process Model (DPM; 
Verbrugge & Jette, 1994). Indeed, the DPM does not assume that everyone diagnosed 
with a pathology (be it a disease, injury, or congenital/developmental condition) 
eventually becomes disabled, nor does it presuppose that all disabled individuals with the 
same underlying pathology arrive at disability in the same way. On the contrary, it 
recognizes individual differences both in patterns of progression from pathology to 
disability and in patterns of response to disability itself. In fact, one of the strengths of 
the model is its acknowledgement that the disablement process, and each of its stages, is 
preventable, modifiable, potentially reversible, and different across individuals. 
 
The reason for the malleability and heterogeneity of the disablement process is 
attributed to its contextual embeddedness. In other words, the model recognizes that the 
disablement process does not occur in a bubble, with only biomedical factors operating. 
Instead, it is influenced by a complex interplay of idiosyncratic intra- and extra-individual 
variables, each of which plays a unique part in speeding up or slowing down 
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the progression from pathology to disability as well as in alleviating, maintaining, or 
aggravating disability itself. For example, if an individual with mild arthritis in the knees 
avoids walking for fear of falling (an intra-individual factor), he/she may become 
disabled sooner than an individual who does not have that fear. Similarly, an individual 
with severe arthritis in the knees who is disabled by his/her inability to climb the stairs 
leading to his/her second-floor apartment may revert to a non-disabled state if an elevator 
is built or if he/she moves to a house without stairs (an extra-individual factor) (Braungart 
Fauth, Zarit, Malmberg, & Johansson, 2007). 
 
This idea is in line with, if not informed by, the lifespan developmental 
perspective. Designed to understand how individuals change over time, this 
perspective recognizes the inherent complexity of life events such as disability. 
Specifically, it recognizes that disability is a dynamic process embedded in historical, 
social, and personal contexts. 
 
Contextual embeddedness implies that psychological adjustment to disability is 
contingent upon the specific circumstances under which disability occurs. These 
include specific characteristics of disability, such as its timing (measured by age at 
disability onset) and its type (determined by the functional impairment underlying it, 
such as physical, intellectual, psychological, etc…). 
 
Age at disability onset. Theories of lifespan development have long recognized 
that disability may have an age-differential effect on subjective well-being. For example, 
according to the tri-factor model of development (Baltes et al., 1980), the dynamic and 
reciprocal relation between age-, history-, and non-normative-related influences differs 
during different stages of the life course. Specifically, the relative importance of age- and 
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history-related influences is speculated to follow a U-shaped curve bottoming out in early 
adulthood and an inverted U-shaped curve peaking in adolescence, respectively, whereas 
the relative importance of non-normative influences is theorized to increase as age 
increases (Baltes et al., 1980). This theory has led researchers to focus on non-normative 
events to understand development in late life, and, importantly, to expect disability to 
have a more substantial impact on SWB for older than for younger people. 
 
Yet, disability may be less of a non-normative event in late life than it is in young 
adulthood and midlife. For example, physical health decrements that may lead to physical 
disability are normatively expected in late adulthood, whereas in young adulthood and 
midlife they are considered as “off-time” events (Wurm, Tomasik, & Tesch-Römer, 
 
2008). Given the negative association postulated to exist between “off-time events” 
and subjective well-being (Hagestad & Neugarten, 1985), it is reasonable to expect that 
disability may have a worse impact on younger than on older adults. 
 
Empirical research has yet to unravel this question. Only two of the 
aforementioned studies examining changes in SWB before and after disability onset 
investigated the extent to which timing of disability moderates the effect of disability on 
SWB, and they yielded dissimilar results. Lucas (2007) found that the older the 
participant at the time of disability onset, the more likely he/she was to report less steep 
declines in life satisfaction in the first year of disability (reaction). Infurna and Wiest 
(2016), on the other hand, found that old age had no protective effect against the short-
term negative consequences of disability on LS. In fact, individuals who became disabled 
after the age of 85, not only showed the strongest (negative) reaction to disability onset, 
they also showed the least ability to bounce back in the years thereafter (adaptation). 
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Conversely, individuals who acquired disability in midlife (between the ages of 40 and 
 
64) reported a significantly greater capacity to adapt than did individuals who 
became disabled either in late adulthood (> 65) or in young adulthood (< 39). 
 
Given these conflicting results, it remains an open question whether and how 
age at disability onset plays a moderating role in the relation between disability and life 
satisfaction. A question also exists as to whether disability may have an age-differential 
effect on the affective component of SWB (positive affect and negative affect). 
 
Type of disability. No existing study examining trajectories of subjective well-
being before and after disability onset (e.g., Infurna & Wiest, 2016, reviewed above) 
probed the question of whether the impact of disability on SWB varies as a function of 
disability type. For a review of current knowledge on this topic, therefore, we must turn 
to the cross-sectional (and/or non-prospective) literature—i.e., to studies that, at best, 
followed participants over time only after disability onset. The first such study (Mehnert, 
Krauss, Nadler, & Boyd, 1990) examined data on life satisfaction collected as part of the 
1986 ICD (International Center for the Disabled) Survey of Disabled Americans. The 
sample (N = 675 working-age individuals who identified themselves as being “disabled” 
or having one or more disabling conditions), was subdivided into four groups according 
to type of disability or disabling condition: (a) physical (45%), (b) sensory (13%), (c) 
mental (9%), and (d) other disabling conditions, such as heart disease, respiratory or 
pulmonary disease, and cancer (29%). The mental disability group included individuals 
with mental illness (psychological disability) as well as persons with developmental 
delay and mental retardation (intellectual disability). 
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Results of chi-square analyses revealed that the disability groups differed 
significantly in levels of life satisfaction. Specifically, the physical disability group, the 
group of individuals with other disabling conditions, and the mental disability group 
reported significantly lower LS levels than did the sensory disability group. Individuals 
with physical, mental, and other disabilities did not differ significantly in LS levels 
among each other, although, notably, the mental disability group reported 
meaningfully higher life satisfaction than the other two groups. 
 
Subsequent studies only partially replicated these results. A case in point is Uppal 
(2006), who analyzed cross-sectional data from 24,036 Canadian citizens living with 
disability (aged 15 to 65+ years) to investigate factors affecting their SWB, including 
type of disability. Uppal (2006) split his sample into the following six subsamples 
according to disability type: mobility, agility, seeing, speaking, hearing, and mental. The 
mental disability group included individuals who were “limited [in their daily activities] 
because of a learning disability, a mental health condition, an intellectual impairment, or 
because of labeling by others.” Subjective well-being, defined as happiness, was an 
ordered variable ranging from 1 to 3, where 1 = very happy, 2 = pretty happy, and 3 = not 
too happy. Results of ordered logit regression showed that individuals with mental 
disability were significantly more likely than any other disability group to report being 
“not too happy.” 
 
Thus, like Mehnert et al. (1990), Uppal (2006) found that the impact of disability 
on SBW varied as a function of disability type. However, his results diverged from those 
of Mehnert et al. (1990) in two important ways. First, they failed to show that individuals 
with sensory disability (the seeing, speaking, and hearing groups) reported significantly 
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higher levels of SWB than any other disability group. Indeed, individuals with physical 
disabilities (the mobility and agility groups) were found to be no less likely to report 
being happy (including “pretty happy” and “very happy”) than the sensory disability 
groups. Second, contrary to Mehnert et al. (1990), who observed that individuals with 
mental disability reported meaningfully higher life satisfaction than those with physical 
(and other) disabilities, Uppal (2006) found that mental disability was associated with 
significantly lower SWB than physical disability. 
 
Neither Uppal (2006) nor Mehnert et al. (1990) offered an interpretation of their 
results. However, both of their major findings—i.e., (a) that individuals with sensory 
disability reported significantly higher LS than any other disability group (Mehnert et 
al., 1990) and (b) that people with mental disability were more likely than any other 
disability group to report low levels of SWB (Uppal, 2006)—are consistent with results 
from other lines of research. 
 
For example, a vast literature on the impact of stigma on people with disability 
has shown that the prejudicial and discriminatory attitudes of the general population 
toward people with disability (public stigma) vary by type of disability. Specifically, 
mental disability—and particularly psychological disability (PD)—is consistently found 
to elicit more stigmatizing responses than any other type of disability, whereas the 
opposite is true for sensory disability (e.g., Ditchman et al., 2013). People typically have 
the least understanding of psychological disability and tend to perceive persons with PD 
as unpredictable and dangerous, despite evidence to the contrary (e.g., Crisp, Gelder, Rix, 
Meltzer, & Rowlands, 2000), or as undeserving of help because they are seen as in 
control of their disabilities and responsible for causing them (Corrigan, Markowitz, 
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Watson, Rowan, & Kubiak, 2003). Given the strong association between stigmatizing 
attitudes and quality of life, either directly or via social isolation and economic 
disadvantage (e.g., Ditchman et al., 2013), these findings suggest that psychological 
disability may have more of a negative impact on subjective well-being than any other 
type of disability. 
 
Similarly, a recent longitudinal study examining the extent to which type of 
disability differentially affects risk of mortality revealed that, although all types of 
disability are associated with an increased risk of all-cause mortality and natural death, 
not all are associated with an increased risk of suicide (Park, Oh, Roh, & Moon, 2017). 
Specifically, individuals with sensory (and especially visual) disability, unlike persons 
with physical, mental, and “other” disabilities appear not to be at increased risk of suicide 
compared to people without disability. Given the strong association between low life 
satisfaction and suicide (e.g., Koivumaa-Honkanen et al., 2001), this finding suggests 
that sensory disability may have less of a negative impact on life satisfaction than 
physical, mental, and other disabilities. 
 
Importantly, in Park et al.’s (2017) study, the mental disability group only included 
individuals with mental illness (psychological disability). Persons with developmental delay 
and mental retardation (intellectual disability) were treated as a separate group, and results 
showed that the two groups differed remarkably in risk of suicide. While individuals with 
intellectual disability did not present a heightened risk of suicide, those with psychological 
disability (the mental disability group) were the highest risk group for suicide. This finding 
shows that individuals with intellectual disability and 
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those with psychological disability are not a homogenous group, thus suggesting the 
need to analyze their data separately rather than pooling them together. 
 
Livneh, Lott, and Antonak (2004), who also investigated between-person 
differences in SWB by type of disability, did make such a distinction. These researchers 
examined patterns of psychological adaptation to chronic illness and disability (CID) by 
conducting a cluster analysis on data collected from 121 American students aged 18 to 60 
(mean age: 32) who registered with their universities’ offices of disability services. 
 
Indicators of psychological adaptation included, among others, life satisfaction, 
perceived quality of life, and emotional distress as measured by the Reactions to 
Impairment and Disability Inventory (RIDI; Livneh & Antonak, 1990). Self-reported 
disabilities were classified into three broad categories: (a) physical-sensory, (b) 
cognitive-learning, and (c) psychiatric-emotional. The cognitive-learning category 
included learning and attention deficit disorders (intellectual disability), whereas the 
psychiatric-emotional category included mental illnesses (psychological disability). 
 
Results of the cluster analysis revealed three broad groups reflecting degree of 
overall psychological adaptation to CID: (a) a psychologically well-adjusted group 
(Adaptive), (b) a psychologically risky group (Nonadaptive), and (c) an in-between group 
(Intermediately Adaptive). Type of disability was found to be associated with cluster 
membership, such that individuals with physical-sensory disability and those with cognitive-
learning disability were most frequently represented in the Adaptive cluster and least 
frequently in the Nonadaptive cluster, whereas the opposite was true for individuals with 
psychiatric-emotional disability. That is, the latter were most frequently included in the 
Nonadaptive cluster and least frequently in the Adaptive cluster. Thus, in line with 
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Park et al.’s (2017) finding that disabled individuals with mental (i.e., psychological) 
disability are the most at risk for suicide, Livneh et al. (2004) found that disabled persons 
with psychological (or, psychiatric-emotional) disability are the most likely to report the 
lowest levels of life satisfaction and quality of life and the highest levels of emotional 
distress. 
 
The Present Study 
 
Both theoretical (e.g., Verbrugge & Jette, 1994) and empirical (e.g., Infurna & 
Wiest, 2016; Lucas, 2007) research strongly suggest a negative relation between high 
subjective well-being and disability. However, as our review of the literature has 
demonstrated, more (longitudinal) evidence is needed to corroborate and extend this 
finding. Longitudinal studies, and particularly studies based on data collection 
commenced prior to disability onset (prospective), have been relatively scarce and have 
yielded mixed results regarding the long- versus the short-term effects of disability on 
SWB (as well as regarding anticipation effects), with some studies finding only short-
term negative effects and others finding both short- and long-term negative 
consequences. Furthermore, longitudinal studies that have examined changes in SWB 
before and after disability onset have limited their investigations to one dimension of 
SWB and, in addition, have largely neglected to examine moderating effects on the 
relation between disability and SWB, beyond that of the degree of disability severity. 
 
This study addressed these gaps using longitudinal prospective survey data from a 
representative sample of Australian individuals ranging in age from 16 to 99 years. 
Specifically, we aimed to answers the following three questions: (1) to what extent are 
different dimensions of SWB—i.e., life satisfaction, positive affect, and negative affect— 
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sensitive to the onset of disability? (2) To what degree does an individual’s age at 
disability onset moderate (i.e., attenuate or augment) the effects of disability on life 
satisfaction, positive affect, and negative affect? (3) Do the effects of disability on life 
satisfaction, positive affect, and negative affect vary by type of disability? 
 
Based on previous theoretical and empirical work, we expected sustained 
disability-related declines in life satisfaction and positive affect and increases in negative 
affect. We hypothesized these changes would be more substantial for life satisfaction 
than for positive affect and negative affect. Our main hypothesis was that any observed 
overall patterns of change would differ based on age at disability onset and type of 
disability. We expected we would replicate Infurna and Wiest’s (2016) finding that 
becoming disabled in midlife (40-64 years) results in less substantial and sustained 
declines in life satisfaction than acquiring a disability in young adulthood (16-39 years) 
or late adulthood (>65 years). We also expected this finding to extend to positive affect 
and negative affect. Lastly, we hypothesized psychological disability to be associated 
with the most substantial and the most sustained declines in SWB, followed by physical 
disability and sensory disability. 
 
Method 
 
Participants 
 
The data for this study were drawn from Waves 1-16 (covering the period 2001-
2016) of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey, an 
ongoing large-scale longitudinal dataset of Australian households and their inhabitants. 
 
Households were selected via a multi-stage area-based random sampling design, and 
all household members older than 15 years of age were asked to participate. Surveys 
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conducted yearly via paper-and-pencil self-completed questionnaires supplemented by 
brief face-to-face (or phone) interviews. The surveys collected information at the 
individual and household levels on a wide range of topics, including socio-
demographics, health, family dynamics, and economic and subjective well-being (see 
Summerfield et al., 2017, for further information on the HILDA Survey’s design, data 
collection process, and assessment variables). 
 
At Wave 1, 7,682 households agreed to participate, generating a sample of 15,127 
eligible respondents. In 2011, the number of eligible respondents (14,352) was increased 
by more than 29% (to 18,634) through the addition to the main household sample of 
2,153 households (Summerfield et al., 2017), mainly as a way to address the under-
representation of immigrants who had entered the country over the previous decade, 
whilst boosting the overall sample size (Watson, 2014). In 2016, the sample comprised 
18,684 eligible respondents, 94.7% of whom returned the questionnaire, including 6,179 
individuals who participated in all waves (Summerfield et al, 2017). 
 
With initial response rates of 66% and 92% for households and individuals, 
respectively, and an average overall wave-on-wave individual attrition rate of about 5% 
(range: approximately 3-13%; see Summerfield et al., 2017, for details), the HILDA 
Survey compares favorably to other long-running panels, such as the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP) and the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) (Watson, 
 
2012). Moreover, although longitudinal attrition is not random (but, instead, related to a 
range of demographic characteristics, including age, marital status, state of residence, 
country of birth, and indigenous status), attrition-adjusted statistical weights provided 
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with the dataset enable subsamples to be representative of the Australian population aged 
15 and over living in private dwellings. 
 
For this study, we analyzed data from those participants who (a) were not disabled 
at study onset but became disabled at some point during the course of the study, (b) did 
not revert back to a non-disability state during the course of the study, and (c) provided 
data on the variables of interest. In total, 9,573 participants met our first two inclusion 
criteria. Of those, 1,272 were excluded from the analyses due to missing data on one or 
more variables of interests, resulting in a sample size of 8,301. This sample was further 
restricted to those participants (N = 3,795) who reported having a physical, sensory, or 
psychological disability only (see below for rationale and details). 
 
On average, participants were in the study for 6.94 years before and 7.94 years 
 
after the onset of disability (range: 1-15 years before and 1-14 years after).5 As shown in 
Table 1, they were, on average, 50.22 years of age at disability onset (SD = 17.40, range: 
16-99), 51.45% were women, 68.24% were married, 56.58% had received a high school 
diploma, and they had an average annual household income of approximately 30,000 
Australian dollars (M = 34,254; SD = 45,991). 
 
Measures 
 
Disability and disability onset. The presence of disability was determined from 
the following question, asked at each wave: “Do you have any long-term health 
condition, impairment or disability that restricts you in your everyday activities, and has 
 
 
 
 
5
 This indicates that likelihood of participation in the study did not decrease following disability onset. 
For this reason, we deemed it unnecessary to compare the subsample of participants who left the study 
after disability onset with the parent sample (to determine whether they might differ significantly on the 
variables of interest). 
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lasted or is likely to last, for 6 months or more?” Respondents were presented with a 
prompt in the form of a showcard listing examples of health conditions, impairments, and 
disabilities. Responses were either Yes or No. Disability onset was operationalized as the 
first wave at which the participant reported having a disability. On average, participants 
were 50.22 years of age at disability onset (SD = 17.40; range: 16-99). 
 
Type of disability. At every wave starting at Wave 3, participants who answered 
positively to the question above were then asked to select, from a list of 17 items, which 
disability(ies) affected them; they were instructed to select any item(s) that applied. For 
the purpose of this study, we classified the 17 disability types into the five categories 
recognized by the Australian Bureau of Statistics: physical, sensory, psychological, 
intellectual, and other/not specified disabilities. Physical disabilities included “chronic or 
recurring pain,” “difficulty gripping things,” “blackouts, fits, or loss of consciousness,” 
“shortness of breath or difficulty breathing,” “limited use of arms or fingers,” “limited 
use of feet or legs,” “any condition that restricts physical activity or physical work (e.g., 
back problems, migraines),” and “any disfigurement or deformity.” Sensory disabilities 
were represented by sight, hearing, and speech problems that cannot be corrected. 
Psychological disabilities included “a nervous or emotional condition which requires 
treatment,” “any mental illness which requires help or supervision,” and “long term 
effects as a result of a head injury, stroke or other brain damage.” Intellectual disabilities 
were learning difficulties. Disabilities classified as other/not specified included “a long-
term condition or ailment which is still restrictive even though it is being treated” and 
“any other long-term condition such as arthritis, asthma, heart disease, Alzheimer’s 
disease, dementia, etc…” 
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Of the 8,301 individuals in our sample who reported having a disability and 
provided data on our variables of interest, 2,242 failed to indicate what type of disability 
they had or reported having more than one type of limitation. We excluded them from our 
analytical sample. We further excluded (a) individuals with intellectual disabilities, 
because the sample (n = 53) was too small to allow for reliable conclusions to be drawn 
about this group, and (b) individuals with other/not specified disabilities (n = 2,211), due 
to theoretical considerations. We reasoned that this category included not disabilities per 
se but rather disabling conditions or pathologies, as defined by the Disablement Model, 
and therefore including it would not add meaningful information on how type of 
disability might moderate the relation between disability and SWB. Thus, our final 
analytic sample comprised 3,795 individuals. Of these, 2,369 (or 62.42%) reported 
having only a physical disability, 785 (or 20.69%) indicated having only a sensory 
disability, 641 (or 16.89%) reported having only a psychological disability. 
 
Subjective well-being. 
 
Life satisfaction. Life satisfaction (LS) was assessed at each wave with the 
question: “All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life?” Responses were 
recorded on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (totally unsatisfied) to 10 (totally satisfied). 
On average, participants provided 13.72 LS observations (SD = 3.61; range: 2-16). Life 
satisfaction is considered a measure of cognitive-evaluative (as opposed to emotional) 
subjective well-being. Typically, it is assessed with the multiple-item Satisfaction with 
Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985), a psychometrically well-
established instrument. The single-item scale used in the HILDA Survey has shown high 
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degree of criterion validity with the SWLS, zero-order r = 0.62–0.64, 
disattenuated r = 0.78–0.80 (Cheung and Lucas, 2014). 
 
Positive affect. Positive affect (PA) was assessed at every wave by asking 
participants to rate on a scale from 1 (all of the time) to 6 (none of the time) “How much 
of the time during the past 4 weeks…” “Did you feel full of life?”, “Have you felt calm 
and peaceful?”, “Did you have a lot of energy?”, and “Have you been a happy person?” 
The four items were reverse-coded—such that higher scores represented more frequent 
experience of positive affect—and aggregated into a single PA score. On average, 
participants provided 13.17 PA observations (SD = 3.78; range: 1-16). Cronbach’s 
alphas ranged from .85 to .90 values from Wave 1 to Wave 16, indicating a high degree 
of internal consistency. 
 
Negative affect. At each wave participants reported on their level of negative 
affect (NA) by answering five questions beginning with the stem “How much of the time 
during the past 4 weeks…” using a 1 (all of the time) to 6 (none of the time) scale. The 
specific questions were “Have you been a nervous person?”, “Have you felt so down in 
the dumps nothing could cheer you up?”, “Have you felt down?”, “Did you feel worn 
out?”, and “Did you feel tired?” A single NA score was calculated by aggregating these 
five items, after they had been reverse-coded such that higher scores reflected more 
frequent experience of negative affect. On average, participants provided 13.17 NA 
observations (SD = 3.77; range: 1-16). Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .81 to .86 values 
from Wave 1 to Wave 16, indicating more than adequate internal consistency. 
 
Covariates. 
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Gender. A categorical variable with two categories (“women” and “men”) was 
created based on self-reported information. Women were slightly more represented than 
men (51.45% versus 48.55%). 
 
Marital status. Marital status was determined from responses to a question asking 
participants to indicate whether they were legally married, in a de facto marriage, 
separated, divorced, widowed, or never married. A categorical variable with two 
categories was created: “married” (including legally married individuals and those who 
reported being in a de facto marital relationship) and “not married.” Most respondents 
were married (68.24%). 
 
Education level. A categorical education level variable was constructed based on 
a survey question asking respondents to report the highest level of education they 
attained. The categories were “at least high school education” and “no high school.” Less 
than half of the respondents (43.42%) reported not having a high school diploma. 
 
Income. Income was divided into three categories based on reported gross annual 
household income (in Australian dollars): 0 (AU$ 0), 1 (up to 29,999), and 2 (AU$ 
 
30,000 or more). More than one third of the respondents (37.47%) reported having no 
income. 
 
Reliable comfort. A reliable comfort variable was created using four items assessing, at 
every wave, the degree to which respondents felt supported when needed. The four 
items, evaluated on a scale from 0 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree), were 
“People don’t come to visit me as often as I’d like,” “I often need help from other 
people but can’t get it,” “I don’t have anyone I can confide in,” and “I have no one to 
lean on in times of trouble.” The items were reverse-coded—such that lower scores were 
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indicative of lower perceived sense of social support in times of need—and averaged to 
form a single index of reliable comfort. Cronbach’s alphas ranged from .71 to .78 values 
from Wave 1 to Wave 16, indicating adequate internal consistency for between-person 
comparisons. Overall, participants reported a high level of reliable comfort (M = 4.27, SD 
= 1.29, range: 0-6). 
 
Statistical Analyses/Analytical Strategy 
 
We used multi-phase growth curve modeling (Cudeck & Klebe, 2002; Fauth et 
al., 2014; Grimm, Ram, & Estabrook, 2016; Ram & Grimm, 2007) to examine our 
research questions. Specifically, two-phase growth curve models were fit to the data to 
 
(a) establish the extent to which different facets of subjective well-being (i.e., life 
satisfaction, positive affect, and negative affect) changed along a time-to/from-disability 
onset axis, and (b) examine the extent to which age at disability onset and type of 
disability moderated such changes. The two phases corresponded to all the years leading 
up to disability onset and all the years following disability onset. 
 
At Level 1, capturing within-person change in subjective well-being over the 
time-to/from-disability onset axis, the models were specified with the following equation 
(Equation 1): 
Yti = β 0 i + β1i min(0, ti ) + β 2 i X 1 + β 3i max(ti − 2, −2) + ε ti 
 
In the equation, Yti represents individual i’s level of life satisfaction, positive affect, 
or negative affect at time t . β0i is an intercept parameter that represents individual 
 
i’s level of LS, PA, or NA two years after the onset of disability. β1i is a slope parameter 
 
capturing direction and rate of linear change in LS, PA, or NA for individual i in the 
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 period preceding disability onset. We referred to this parameter as “Pre” in our tables. β2i 
 
is an individual-specific parameter detecting level change in LS, PA, or NA the year 
 
surrounding disability onset (Reaction). β3i is a slope parameter characterizing direction 
 
and rate of linear change in LS, PA, or NA in the period following disability onset, which 
 
we named “Post” in our tables, and ε ti is the residual error for individual i at time t . t 
refers to the number of years to-/from-disability onset; it was obtained by realigning each 
individual’s time series along the common event of disability onset. The minimum 
function min(0,ti ) represents the period preceding the year of disability onset (Year 0). 
X1 is a time-varying dummy-coded variable that was created to isolate the transition into 
 
disability (i.e., Year 0). Accordingly, it was coded as 0 for all the years prior to disability, 
as 1 for the observation of the reported disability (Year 0), and as 0 for all time-points 
following disability onset. The maximum function max(ti − 2,−2) refers to the number of 
 
years separating individual i’s time t (in years) from the year of disability onset. The 
function uses “ −2 ” instead of “0” to allow for the intercept to be set at two years 
after disability onset, Year +2. 
 
At Level 2, capturing between-person variation, the models were specified by the 
following equations (Equations 2, 3, 4, and 5): 
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In the equations, β   , β1 , β2 , and β3 (the individual-specific intercept and slope 
0i i i i 
 
parameters from the Level-1 models given in Equation 1) are a function of two types of 
factors: (a) fixed effects (the model coefficients), which represent between-person mean 
level and rates of change (γ 00 ,γ 10 ,γ 20 ,γ 30 ) and (b) individual-specific random effects 
 
(i.e., u0i ,u1i ,u2i , and u3i ), also known as Level-2 residuals. These latter capture inter- 
 
individuals differences in level and rate of change and were assumed to be normally 
 
distributed, correlated with each other, and uncorrelated with the residual errors,ε ti . 
 
Linear and quadratic terms for participants’ age at disability onset, and linear 
terms for the three types of disability, and for participants’ gender, marital status, 
education level, income, and mean levels of reliable comfort were added to the models as 
Level-2 (between-person) moderators of Level-1 models’ parameters β , β1 , β2 , and β3 . 
0i i i i 
 
For example, to examine moderation by age-at-disability-onset, without adjusting for 
any other variables, our models (Models 2) were specified by the following Level-2 
equations: 
 β 0 i = γ 00 + γ 01 Agei + γ 02 Agei 2 + u0i 
 
β1i = γ 10 + γ 11 Agei + γ 12 Agei 2 + u1i 
 
β 2 i = γ 20 + γ 21 Agei + γ 22 Agei 2 + u2i 
 
β 3 i = γ 30 + γ 31 Agei + γ 32 Agei 2 + u3i 
 
Of particular interest was whether these variables were related to individuals’ 
 
pre-disability-onset slopes ( β1i ) and reaction to ( β2i ) and adaptation to disability onset ( 
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 β3i ). All continuous moderator variables (i.e., age at disability and reliable comfort) were 
 
grand-mean centered. 
 
Analyses were performed using SAS PROC MIXED (SAS Version 9.4). 
Maximum likelihood estimation was used to estimate the parameters, and the goodness of 
fit of the models was evaluated through the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). Missing data were assumed to be missing at 
random (MAR) at the within-person level and, to retain longitudinal data, missing 
completely at random (MCAR) at the between-person level (Little & Rubin, 2014). We 
checked for patterns of missing data in LS, PA, and NA that could be attributed to 
between-person differences in key variables of interests. Specifically, we conducted 
regression analyses regressing number of observations provided before and after 
disability onset for LS, PA, and NA on age-at-disability-onset, type of disability, gender, 
marital status, education level, income, and reliable comfort. We then compared 
standardized regression coefficients using the formula Z = 
 b1 − b2   . The results  
 
   
 
 
SE 
2
 + SE 2 
 
    
 
  b1 b2 
   
showed that number of observations provided before and after disability onset for LS, 
PA, and NA differed based on age-at-disability-onset (Z > 1.645) but did not differ based 
on gender, type of disability, marital status, education level, income, and reliable comfort 
(Zs = -.19 to .83). Analyses are available upon request. 
 
Results 
 
The Effect of Disability on Life Satisfaction, Positive Affect, and Negative Affect 
 
To address our first research question, we estimated three “unconditional” (i.e., 
 
with no other predictors than the time variables) multiphase growth curve models, one 
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 each of our outcomes: life satisfaction, positive affect, and negative affect. The results 
are given in Table 5 and Figures 1a, 1b, and 1c. The fixed effect estimates displayed in 
the first column of Table 5 indicate that, on average, LS declined in the period leading up 
to disability onset (pre:γ 10 = -0.01, p < .01), dropped substantially the year of onset 
 
(reaction: γ 20 = -0.15, p < .01), and then stopped declining and, in fact, showed a 
 
tendency to rebound in the years thereafter (post: γ 30 = 0.01, p < .01). However, 
importantly, it never returned to pre-disability-onset levels, as graphically illustrated by 
the red line in Figure 1a. 
 
Similarly, as indicated by the fixed effect estimates displayed in the second 
column of Table 5, average levels of positive affect decreased in the period preceding 
 
disability onset (pre: γ 10 = -0.01, p < .01), dropped significantly the year surrounding 
 
disability onset (reaction: γ 20 = -0.13, p < .01), and then stopped declining but did not 
 
rebound in the years thereafter (post:γ 30 = 0.002, p > .05). The red line in Figure 1b 
graphically illustrates this course of change. Conversely, as indicated by the fixed effect 
estimates displayed in the third column of Table 5, levels of negative affect, on average, 
remained stable in the period leading up to disability onset (pre:γ 10 = -0.003, p > .01), 
 
increased significantly the year surrounding disability onset (reaction:γ 20 = 0.10, p < .01), 
 
and then showed a tendency to return toward baseline (post:γ 30 = -0.01, p < .01). 
However, as illustrated by the red line in Figure 1c, the return (decrease) in the years 
following disability onset never brought levels of NA back to their pre-disability-
onset values. 
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Taken together, these results suggest that (a) the average courses of change in LS, 
PA, and NA before and after disability onset are comparable, (b) on average, individuals 
experience substantial declines in SWB as a function of the disablement process, and (c) 
these declines are not sustained over time but levels of SWB never fully return to pre-
disability-onset values. 
 
The random effect estimates displayed at the bottom of Table 5 indicate 
 
substantial between-person differences in the extent to which LS, PA, and NA changed 
before and after disability onset. This is also evident from the grey lines in Figures 1a, 
1b, and 1c, which represent a “spaghetti plot” of data obtained from a subset of 200 
participants. No two grey lines trace the same trajectory of LS, PA, or NA along the 
time-to-/from-disability onset axis. This observation begs the question of what factors 
might contribute to such between-person variation. We addressed this question in the 
second part of this study, beginning with a set of analyses designed to examine whether 
and to what extent age at disability onset might moderate disability-related changes in LS, 
PA, and NA. 
 
The Moderating Role of Age at Disability Onset 
 
To address our second research question, we estimated a set of three multiphase 
growth curve models that included linear and quadratic terms for age at disability onset 
 
(Age and Age
2
) as predictors/moderators. The results are given in Table 6 and Figures 2a, 2b, 
and 2c. The fixed effect estimates displayed in the first column of Table 6 indicate that age 
at disability onset significantly moderated average changes in life satisfaction in the period 
leading up to disability onset (pre × age: γ 11 = 0.01, p < .01; pre × age2:γ 12 = - 
 
0.004, p < .01) and in the years thereafter (post × age2:γ 32 = -0.01, p < .01). No 
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moderation effect of age at disability onset was found on the relation between reaction 
 
and life satisfaction (reaction × age: γ 21 = 0.01, p > .05; reaction × age2: γ 22 = -0.01, p > 
 
.05), indicating no differences in the way LS levels changed the year surrounding 
disability onset based on individuals’ age at disability onset. 
 
Figure 2a provides a graphic representation of these results. In the figure, the 
three colored lines, derived from the model’s fixed effect estimates, represent average 
trajectories of LS along the time-to/from-disability onset axis for individuals in young 
adulthood (30 years old), midlife (50 years old), and old age (70 years old). They show 
that the three age groups did not differ in their initial response to disability onset; they all 
experienced an equally significant drop in levels of life satisfaction the year they first 
reported having disability. However, in the years thereafter, individuals in midlife 
showed a tendency to return to baseline, individuals in young adulthood only showed a 
tendency to return toward (but not to) baseline, and individuals in old age showed no 
such tendency and instead reported sustained lower levels of, and even a slight decline in, 
life satisfaction. This slight decline is all the more meaningful because it cannot be 
attributed to a general tendency for older adults’ LS to decline over time. Indeed, contrary 
to individuals in young adulthood, whose average levels of life satisfaction declined in 
the period preceding disability onset, individuals in old age, on average, reported 
increases in LS prior to disability onset. 
 
The second column of Table 6 shows similar results for positive affect. 
Specifically, the fixed effect estimates indicate a significant age-differential effect on 
 
average rates of change in PA in the period prior to disability onset (pre × age: γ 11 = 0.01, 
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p < .01; pre × age
2
:γ 12 = -0.002, p < .01) and in the years thereafter (post × age: γ 31 = - 
 
0.01, p < .01; post × age2:γ 32 = -0.003, p < .01) but not on average level changes the year 
 
surrounding disability onset. The interaction parameters involving reaction did not reach 
 
statistical significance (reaction × age: γ 21 = -0.004, p > .05; reaction × age2: γ 22 = - 
0.001, p > .05). As illustrated in Figure 2b, these results suggest that age at disability 
onset had no moderating effect on individuals’ initial response to disability onset; all 
age groups reported equally significant drops in PA the year of disability onset. 
However, whereas individuals in midlife and those in young adulthood showed a 
tendency to rebound following the initial drop, individuals in old age, on average, 
showed no such tendency; in fact, their levels of PA further declined after the initial 
drop. As in the case with LS, this decline in PA in the years following disability onset is 
meaningful because it cannot be attributed to a general tendency for older adults’ PA to 
decrease over time. Indeed, unlike young adults’ PA, older adults’ PA showed no 
average (linear) decline in the years preceding disability onset. 
 
The third column of Table 6 shows comparable results for negative affect. The 
fixed effect estimates at the top of the column indicate that age at disability onset had no 
moderating effect on changes (increases) in NA levels the year when disability was first 
 
reported (reaction × age: γ 21 = -0.02, p > .05; reaction × age2: γ 22 = 0.003, p > .05) but did 
have a moderating effect on both pre-and post-disability-onset slopes. Indeed, the two sets of 
interaction parameters representing the influence of age at disability onset on rates of change 
in NA before disability onset (pre × age: γ 11 = -0.003, p < .01; pre × age2:γ 12 = 
 
0.002, p < .01) and those representing age moderation of changes in NA following 
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 disability onset (post × age: γ 31 = 0.01, p < .01; post × age2:γ 32 = 0.002, p < .01) were 
both statistically significant. Figure 2c provides a graphic illustration of these results. 
The three colored lines—representing average trajectories of NA for individuals in 
young adulthood, midlife, and old age—show that the three age groups did not differ in 
their initial reaction to disability onset; they all experienced an equally significant 
increase in NA the year of disability onset. However, whereas individuals in midlife and, 
to a lesser extent, those in young adulthood showed a tendency to return to baseline 
following disability onset, individuals in old age showed no such tendency and, in fact, 
reported sustained increases in NA in the years thereafter. This increase is all the more 
meaningful in light of the fact that it did not constitute the continuation of a pre-existing 
trend; instead, it only began the year of, and is thus attributable to, disability onset. 
 
Taken together, these findings suggest that (a) age at disability onset does have 
moderating effects on disability-related changes in LS, PA, and NA, (b) these moderating 
effects are comparable across the three dimensions of SWB, and (c) SWB is most likely 
to show only short-term declines when disability onset occurs in midlife. Conversely, 
when disability onset occurs in old age, SWB is most likely to show both short- and long-
term declines. 
 
The Moderating Role of Type of Disability 
 
In a subsequent set of three multiphase growth curve models, we included type of 
disability as a predictor/moderator to examine whether the effect of disability on life 
satisfaction, positive affect, and negative affect varied by disability type (physical, 
sensory, psychological). The results are given in Table 7 and Figures 3a, 3b, and 3c. The 
 
fixed effect estimates displayed in the first column of Table 7 indicate significant 
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 differences among the three disability groups in level and rates of change in life 
satisfaction before and after disability onset. The physical disability group, on average, 
did not report significant declines in LS in the period preceding disability onset (pre × 
physical: γ 13 = -0.01, p > .05) but showed both a significant reaction to disability onset 
 
(reaction × physical: γ 23 = -0.14 + 0 = -0.14, p < .01) and no significant signs of 
 
adaptation in the years thereafter (post × physical: γ 33 = 0.002 + 0 = 0.002, p > .05). The 
 
black line in Figure 3a graphically illustrates this course of change. The sensory disability 
group, on the other hand, as illustrated by the blue line in Figure 3a, reported no significant 
changes in LS at any time point (pre × sensory: γ 11 = -0.01 + 0.002 = -0.008, 
 
p > .05; reaction × sensory: γ 21 = -0.14 + 0.11 = -0.03, p > .05; post × sensory:γ 31 = 
0.002 + -0.01 = -0.008, p > .05). Yet different was the pattern of changes in average levels 
of LS for the psychological disability group. As illustrated by the magenta-colored line in 
Figure 3a, average levels of LS for this group decreased in the period preceding disability 
onset (pre × psychological: γ 12 = -0.01 + -0.02 = -0.03, p < .01). They further 
 
decreased (and more substantially so than did those of the physical disability group) the 
 
year disability was first reported (reaction × psychological: γ 22 = -0.14 + -0.16 = -0.30, p 
 
< .01), but then bounced back (post × psychological: γ 32 = 0.002 + 0.08 = 0.082, p < .01), 
 
returning to baseline within 5 years after disability onset. 
 
The second column of Table 7 shows somewhat similar results for positive affect. 
The fixed effect estimates at the top of the column indicate that the effect of disability on 
PA varied greatly by type of disability. Physical disability was associated with a 
 
substantial drop in levels of PA the year when disability was first reported (reaction × 
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 physical: γ 23 = -0.14 + 0 = -0.14, p < .01) and no significant propensity for PA to rebound 
 
in the years thereafter (post × physical: γ 33 = 0.002 + 0 = 0.002, p > .05), as graphically 
illustrated by the black line in Figure 3b. Sensory disability was not associated with a 
significant drop in levels of PA the year when disability was first reported (reaction × 
sensory: γ 21 = -0.14 + 0.11 = 0.03, p > .05) but rather with a steady, linear decline in PA 
 
following disability onset (post × sensory: γ 31 = 0.002 + -0.03 = -0.028, p < .01), as 
graphically illustrated by the blue line in Figure 3b. Psychological disability was 
associated with the most substantial drop in levels of PA the year when disability was 
first reported (reaction × psychological: γ 22 = -0.14 + -0.08 = -.0.22, p < .01) but also 
 
with a significant propensity for PA to return to pre-disability-onset levels in the years 
 
thereafter (post × psychological: γ 32 = 0.002 + 0.04 = 0.042, p < .01). The magenta- 
 
colored line in Figure 3b graphically illustrates this course of change. 
 
The third column of Table 7 shows somewhat comparable results for negative 
affect. The fixed effect estimates displayed at the top of the column indicate that the 
three disability groups differed significantly from one another in the way they responded 
emotionally to disability, in terms of NA. The physical disability group, on average, 
showed a strong reaction to the onset of disability (as evidenced by the significant 
increase in mean levels of NA at Year 0; reaction × physical: γ 23 = 0.10 + 0 = 0.10, p < 
 
.01) followed by significant signs of adaptation in the years thereafter (post × physical: 
 
γ 33 = -0.01 + 0 = -0.01, p < .01). The black line in Figure 3c illustrates this course of 
 
change. The sensory disability group, on the other hand, reported no significant increases 
 
in average levels of NA following disability onset (reaction × sensory: γ 21 = -0.10 + -
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 = 0.03, p > .05; post × sensory: γ 31 = -0.01 + 0.02 = 0.02, p > .05), as illustrated by the 
 
blue line in Figure 3c. The psychological disability group showed the strongest reaction 
to disability onset (as evidenced by the significantly greater increase in NA at Year 0, 
compared to that of the physical disability group; reaction × psychological: γ 22 = 0.10 + 
 
0.13 = -.0.22, p < .01) but also the strongest signs of adaptation (γ 32 = -0.01 + -0.04 = - 
 
0.05, p < .01). In fact, as illustrated by the magenta-colored line in Figure 3c, for 
this group adaptation was complete within 5 years post-disability-onset. 
 
Taken together, these results suggest that (a) type of disability has significant 
moderating effects on disability-related changes in SWB, (b) these changes are 
comparable across different dimensions of SWB (life satisfaction, positive affect, and 
negative affect), and (c) individuals with sensory disability are the least affected by 
disability. Conversely, individuals with physical disability are the most likely to report 
both short- and long-term declines in SWB as a result of acquiring disability. 
 
Final models 
 
In a final step, we estimated a set of three multiphase growth curve models that 
combined age at disability onset, type of disability, gender, education, income, marital 
status, and reliable comfort as predictors. The results are given in Table 8. The fixed 
effect estimates displayed in the first column of the table indicate that gender, education, 
income, marital status, and reliable comfort were all significant predictors of changes in 
life satisfaction before, at, and/or after disability onset. For example, gender significantly 
moderated the reaction parameter (reaction × gender: γ 26 = -0.04 + -0.08 = -0.12, p < 
 
.01) such that male participants were more likely than their female counterparts to show 
 
 
45 
 substantial declines in LS the year when disability was first reported. At the same time, the 
results also showed that the moderating effects of age at disability onset and of type of 
disability on changes in life satisfaction before and after disability onset held after including 
all these variables. Specifically, age at disability onset moderated linear changes in LS both 
before and after disability onset (pre × age: γ 11 = 0.01, p < .01; pre × 
 
age
2
:γ 12 = -0.004, p < .01; post × age2:γ 32 = -0.01, p < .01) such that individuals in young 
adulthood and those in old age were significantly more likely than individuals in midlife to 
experience declines in LS following disability onset. Type of disability moderated changes 
in LS such that psychologically-disabled individuals were significantly more likely than their 
physically-disabled and sensory-disabled counterparts to report declines in LS during the 
period leading up to disability onset (pre × psychological: γ 14 = 0.003 + 
 
-0.02 = -0.017, p < .01) as well as the year when disability was first reported (reaction × 
 
psychological: γ 24 = -0.04 + -0.14 = -0.18, p < .01). However, these individuals were also 
 
likely, unlike physically-disabled and sensory-disabled participants, to significantly 
 
rebound in the years thereafter (post × psychological:γ 34 = 0.002 + 0.08 = 0.082, p < 
 
.01). 
 
Similarly, the fixed effect estimates displayed in the second column of Table 8 
indicate that gender, income, marital status, and reliable comfort (but not education) were all 
significant predictors of disability-related changes in positive affect. For example, marital 
status moderated linear changes in PA following disability onset (post × married: 
 γ 26 = 0.01 + 0.01 = 0.02, p < .01) such that not being married was significantly more 
 
likely than being married to predict a return toward baseline levels of PA after the 
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 of disability. At the same time, as in the case with LS, the inclusion of these 
variables/covariates did not render the effects of age at disability onset and of type of 
disability insignificant. On the contrary, age at disability onset was still found to play a 
significant moderating role on changes in PA before (pre × age: γ 11 = 0.004, p < .01; pre 
 
× age2:γ 12 = -0.003, p < .01) and after disability onset (post × age: γ 31 = -0.005, p < .01; 
 
post × age
2
:γ 32 = -0.003, p < .01). These estimate indicate that people in old age were 
significantly more likely than their younger counterparts to report declines in PA following 
disability onset. Type of disability was found to significantly moderate disability-related 
changes in PA, such that people with physical disability and those with sensory disability 
were significantly more likely than their psychologically-disabled counterparts to 
experience long-lasting (as opposed to short-lived) drops in PA after the onset of disability. 
 
 
The third column of Table 8 shows results for negative affect. The fixed effect 
estimates displayed at the top of the column indicate that gender, marital status, and reliable 
comfort (but not education and income) were all significant predictors of changes in NA 
across the disability transition. For example, reliable comfort significantly and positively 
interacted with the post-disability-onset slope parameter (post × reliable comfort: γ 315 = 0.01, 
p < .01), indicating that disabled individuals who reported higher 
 
levels of reliable comfort were significantly less likely than those who reported lower 
levels of reliable comfort to return to baseline levels of NA in the period following 
disability onset. In addition, as in the case with LS and PA, the effects of age at disability 
onset and of type of disability remained significant. Age at disability onset moderated 
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disability-related changes in NA such that the older the individual, the less likely his or 
 
her levels of NA were to bounce back after the initial significant drop (post × age: γ 31 = 
 
0.01, p < .01; post × age2:γ 32 = 0.002, p < .01). Type of disability moderated changes in 
 
NA throughout the disability transition (e.g., reaction: γ 20 = 0.07, p < .01; reaction × 
 
psychological: γ 24 = 0.10 = p < .01). These estimates indicate that disabled individuals’ 
 
reaction and adaptation to disability varied greatly by type of disability, with 
psychologically-disabled people reporting, on average, the steepest increases in NA 
the year surrounding disability but also the highest capacity to rebound in the years 
thereafter. 
 
Discussion 
 
The present study applied multiphase growth-curve models to prospective 
longitudinal survey data collected from a large representative sample of Australians, 
aged 16 to 99 years, to estimate within-person changes in subjective well-being before 
and after disability onset. The goal of the study was threefold: (a) examine and compare 
changes across disability onset for three different facets of subjective well-being (life 
satisfaction, positive affect, and negative affect), (b) determine whether and how such 
changes differed by age at disability onset, and (c) determine whether and how they 
differed by type of disability. 
 
Based on previous theoretical and empirical work, we expected sustained disability-
related declines in life satisfaction and positive affect and increases in negative affect. We 
hypothesized these changes would be more substantial for life satisfaction than for positive 
affect and negative affect. Our main hypothesis was that any observed 
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overall patterns of change would differ based on age at disability onset and type of 
disability. We expected we would replicate Infurna and Wiest’s (2016) finding that 
becoming disabled in midlife (40-64 years) results in less substantial and sustained 
declines in life satisfaction than acquiring a disability in young adulthood (16-39 years) 
or late adulthood (>65 years). We also expected this finding to extend to positive affect 
and negative affect. Lastly, we hypothesized psychological disability to be associated 
with the most substantial and the most sustained declines in SWB, followed by physical 
disability and sensory disability. 
 
The Effect of Disability on Life Satisfaction, Positive Affect, and Negative Affect 
 
Our first hypothesis was partially supported. We found that positive affect, on 
average, dropped to a statistically-significant degree the year when disability was first 
reported and then stopped declining but showed no signs of rebounding in the years 
thereafter. Conversely, average levels of negative affect increased to a statistically-
significant degree the year when disability was first reported and then, despite 
rebounding somewhat, never fully returned to pre-onset levels. 
 
We found a conceptually comparable pattern of change for life satisfaction, but 
only on a trend level. Our initial model (with no predictors but the time variables) 
revealed a statistically-significant decline in LS the year of disability onset followed by 
(only) partial adaptation in the years thereafter (see Figure 1a). However, this finding did 
not hold in our last model (controlling for age-at-disability-onset, type of disability, 
gender, educational level, income, marital status, and reliable comfort; see Table 8). 
Instead, our last model confirmed the direction, but not the strength, of post-disability- 
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onset changes, indicating that life satisfaction remained rather stable across the disability 
transition. 
 
This latter result was surprising in light of previous theoretical (e.g., Verbrugge & 
Jette, 1984) and empirical (e.g., Infurna & Wiest, 2016) work suggesting a strong 
negative association between disability onset and life satisfaction. Indeed, even though 
not all previous studies found evidence of long-lasting disability effects, they all reported 
a substantial drop in life satisfaction immediately following onset. 
 
One explanation for the diverging results may lie in the presence of cross-country 
differences. The present study used data from a sample representative of the Australian 
population; most other studies analyzed data from Germany (GSOEP), the U.K. (BHPS), 
or Switzerland (SHP). It may be that, compared to the citizens of Germany, Switzerland, 
and the U.K., Australians have access to more resources, personal or otherwise, that play 
a role in alleviating the negative impact of disability onset on SWB. For example, a 
recent study using representative samples of 142 countries around the world found 
Australians to be more optimistic than most other nations, including Switzerland, 
Germany, and the U.K. (Gallagher, Lopez, & Pressman, 2013). Optimism, defined as a 
person’s positive expectations for the future, has been found to play an important role in 
shaping how people respond to the onset of chronic illness (e.g., multiple sclerosis, 
rheumatoid arthritis). Low optimism exposes people diagnosed with chronic illness to 
higher risk for reduced well-being (e.g., Dunn et al., 2013; Ferreira & Sherman, 2007; 
Martz & Livneh, 2016). It is possible that low optimism plays a similar role following the 
onset of a disability, thus explaining the steeper post-disability-onset declines in LS in 
Germans, Britons, and Swiss, compared to Australians. 
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It may also be that Australia offers better material and social resources to its 
disabled population, compared to Germany, Switzerland, and the U.K. According to a 
recent report by the OECD (2019), the Australian government’s total spending on 
“incapacity due to disability, sickness, or occupational injury” has traditionally been 
much higher than that of the U.K. and Germany and, in recent years, even higher than 
that of Switzerland. For example, between 2000 and 2015, the last year for which data 
were available, Australia’s total spending on incapacity—including cash benefits and 
benefits in kind (e.g., rehabilitation services, home-help services)—hovered around 
2.4% of its GDP, almost half a point higher than the 2.0% of Germany and the U.K. 
 
A second explanation for the observed discrepancy between our and previous 
studies’ findings may lie in the presence of cohort-differences. Our data were collected 
between the mid-2000s and the mid-2010s and, as such, may reflect social progress in the 
treatment of and accommodations for persons with disability, across countries. 
Specifically, it may be that new anti-discrimination laws and civil-right protections for 
the disabled (Degener, 2016), coupled with the advent of ever-improving technologies to 
assist them in their everyday life, are facilitating greater psychological adaptation to 
disability onset, compared to previous decades. This would be consistent with several 
theories, including conceptual accounts of disability such as the Disablement Process 
Model (Verbrugge & Jette, 1994), suggesting that disability is a dynamic process shaped 
by a complex interplay of both biomedical and non-biomedical (including personal and 
environmental) factors embedded in historical context. 
 
Although our hypothesis was only partially supported, our results cannot be 
interpreted as indicating a general process of hedonic adaptation following disability 
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onset. Such a characterization implies that individuals who acquire a disability, on 
average, either maintain or return to pre-disability-onset values of SWB. However, our 
results suggest that, although people’ cognitive evaluations of their life (life satisfaction) 
remain rather stable across the disability transition, their emotional evaluations of their 
life (affective well-being) experience long-lasting negative changes, on average. Our 
results provide further evidence against the set-point theory of hedonic adaptation 
(Brickman and Campbell, 1971) and for a more moderate viewpoint that allows for 
processes of adaptation to differ based on the type of stressor (Diener, Lucas, & Scollon, 
2009). 
 
Differences among Life Satisfaction, Positive Affect, and Negative Affect 
 
Our second hypothesis was not supported and, in fact, our analyses yielded two 
unexpected findings. First, cognitive well-being is less, not more, strongly affected by 
disability onset than is affective well-being. Second, there is a difference in the extent to 
which the two facets of affective well-being respond to the onset of disability; negative 
affect, on average, rebounds somewhat after an initial decline whereas positive affect, on 
average, shows no sign of rebounding whatsoever. 
 
Plausible explanations for why cognitive well-being and affective well-being 
were found to be differentially sensitive to disability onset may be related to structural 
differences between the measures we used to assess them and the diverse time frames of 
these measures (i.e., global for life satisfaction versus “past 4 weeks” for positive and 
negative affects). A recent study suggests, however, that time frames typically do not 
moderate associations between cognitive and affective indicators of SWB and important 
correlates (e.g., life events) (Luhmann, Hawkley, Eid, & Cacioppo, 2012). Rather, 
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differences across indicators like the ones used in this study seem to reflect the use of 
different sources of information when making well-being judgments. Specifically, 
when making cognitive well-being judgements, people tend to evaluate global life 
circumstances, such as income and marital status, whereas, when they make affective 
well-being judgments, they tend to focus on recent events and specific activities, 
regardless of the particular time frame (Luhmann et al., 2012a). This is in line with the 
observation that life satisfaction results from cognitive evaluations that include the 
present situation as well as former phases of life (e.g., Smith et al., 1999). Life 
satisfaction may, therefore, be less suited to capture the daily strains that people likely 
experience when they transition into and learn to live with disability, compared to 
positive affect and negative affect. Alternatively, emotion-based well-being could be 
more responsive to disability onset purely because it involves less cognitive processing. 
Either way, this finding highlights the importance of including measures of affective 
well-being when assessing the effects of disability onset on SWB. 
 
Following this line of reasoning, the differential sensitivity to disability onset of 
positive affect and negative affect may reflect the particular nature of the daily strains that 
accompany disability onset. Specifically, our results suggest that it is the absence of 
experiences that elicit positive affect, rather than the presence of experiences that elicit 
negative affect that burdens newly-disabled people the most, in the long-run. Experiences 
that elicit negative affect (e.g., relocating to a new, unfamiliar accommodation) may 
diminish over time, albeit slowly, but experiences that elicit positive affect (e.g., 
participating in a hobby, having joyful encounters with others) do not seem to increase over 
time. This has implications for public policy concerned with improving the life of 
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people with disability—and societal well-being in general. If, broadly speaking, people 
who acquire a disability may appraise their life as positively (or almost as positively) as 
they did before disability onset but still feel worse in emotional terms, and more so in 
terms of positive affect than in terms of negative affect, then different interventions may 
be needed to influence the different components of SWB. 
 
Between-Person Differences 
 
Our main research question was whether any observed overall patterns of 
disability-related change in SWB differ based on age at disability onset and type of 
disability. The results (discussed in the following sections) provided further clarity to the 
mixed findings of previous work, by confirming that it may be when disability is 
acquired, not acquiring a disability that results in long-term negative consequences for SWB 
(Lucas, 2007, Study 1; Infurna & Wiest, 2016). The results also suggested that type of 
disability is another important moderator of the relation between disability onset and SWB. 
 
 
Before discussing these results, however, we note another important finding. Our 
analyses showed, consistent with Lucas (2007), Anusic et al. (2014), and Infurna and 
Wiest (2016), that there are substantial between-person differences in hedonic responses 
to disability onset—whether based on age at disability onset (timing of disability), type 
of disability, other characteristics of disability, or other variables altogether. Indeed, as 
shown in Figure 1a, not all individuals reported insignificant declines in LS following 
disability onset. Many showed substantial and even sustained declines, while some 
(fewer) showed positive growth. Similarly, as shown by the grey lines in Figures 1b and 
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1c, there was considerable variability around the sample-average trajectories of positive 
affect and negative affect. 
 
This finding is important because it highlights the need for researchers to move 
beyond the examination of average trends when studying people’s hedonic responses to 
major life events. Examining only average trends can lead researchers to overlook the 
presence of individual differences in hedonic adaptation. Yet, knowing that such 
differences exist is crucial, on at least two levels. First, theoretically, it supports the 
notion, contrary to the set-point theory of adaptation (Brickman and Campbell, 1971), 
that life events are important for our understanding of long-term SWB. Indeed, if people 
respond differently to life events, then all happiness is not due to a genetically-
determined set-point (or temperament). Second, knowing that between-person 
differences exist makes it imperative to investigate what might determine them—i.e., 
identify who is more at risk for long-term negative consequences and, conversely, what 
distinguishes those who maintain stable trajectories. 
 
The Moderating Role of Age at Disability Onset 
 
As we hypothesized based on the life course perspective, according to which 
the impact of major life events on developmental outcomes should vary according to 
when these events occur in a person’s life (e.g., Elder, 1998), we found that individuals 
did differ in their responses to disability onset based on their age at onset—though in 
surprising directions. 
 
Specifically, our results showed that individuals in midlife, on average, 
experienced a statistically-significant drop in life satisfaction the year they first reported 
having a disability, but then showed a tendency to return to baseline. Young adults, after 
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an equally significant initial drop, also showed adaptation but at a much slower rate, such 
that, even five years post-onset, they remained below baseline (or pre-onset levels). 
Lastly, individuals in old age, after an equally significant initial drop, showed no signs of 
adaptation and instead reported sustained lower levels of, and even a slight decline, in 
life satisfaction. These results largely held after controlling for type of disability, gender, 
educational level, income, marital status, and reliable comfort (see fixed-effect estimates 
from our final model in Column 1 of Table 8). Although our final model did not reveal 
significant changes in life satisfaction across the disability transition, it confirmed the 
moderation by age-at-disability-onset effect. Individuals in midlife, young adulthood, and 
old age were found to differ significantly in their rates of change in the years following 
disability onset—with midlife adults being significantly more likely to maintain stable 
levels of life satisfaction than the other two age groups, especially the old age group, 
which showed the steepest and most sustained declines. 
 
This finding replicated Infurna and Wiest’s (2016) and was further supported by the 
results of our analyses assessing affective well-being. Indeed, we found that all three age 
groups, on average, reported significant declines in positive affect immediately following 
disability onset, but whereas young and midlife adults showed a tendency to rebound in the 
years thereafter, individuals in old age showed no such tendency; in fact, they reported 
further declines. Conversely, we found that all three age groups experienced an increase in 
negative affect immediately following disability onset, but whereas midlife adults and, to a 
lesser extent, young adults showed a tendency to return to baseline in the years thereafter, 
individuals in old age showed no such tendency; in fact, they reported sustained increases 
in negative affect following disability onset. 
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Taken together, these findings indicate, contrary to Lucas’ (2007) conclusion, that 
 
old age offers no protection against the detrimental effects of disability onset on SWB. As 
such, although they replicated the results of Infurna and Wiest (2016), they remain 
surprising. Current theories on age-differential effects of disability onset on SWB derive 
from the life course perspective, which predicts an opposite scenario. According to the life 
course perspective, because the risk of acquiring disability increases with age, acquiring 
disability in old age is likely to be perceived as more normative—or as an “on-time” event—
and, as such, less stressful (e.g., Neugarten, 1996). Before old age, on the contrary, acquiring 
limitations in ADLs or mobility- and functional-related activities such as walking, standing, 
and lifting or carrying weights is likely to be considered as “early” and therefore indicative of 
premature aging (Bierman & Statland, 2010). The early nature of the experience is also likely 
to invite stronger upward social comparisons to similarly aged-peers (van Solinge & 
Henkens, 2007) as well as to make it appear more conspicuous and unusual to others 
(Rozario & Derienzis, 2009), thereby increasing the risk of stigmatizing attitudes and 
behaviors (e.g., Calsyn & Winter, 2001). Furthermore, even if newly-disabled people in 
young adulthood and midlife suffer neither self-denigration nor social stigma, they may have 
fewer social support resources than people in old age (Rook, Catalano, & Dooley, 1989). 
Being “off-time” necessarily means that relatively few of one’s similarly-aged peers are 
simultaneously experiencing the same disability-related changes. Thus, even if available for 
support, one’s peers may not know how best to provide it (Rook et al., 1989). Moreover, the 
strains associated with off-time events may actually disrupt existing social relationships 
(Neugarten & Hagenstad, 1976). 
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Some (or all) of these factors may account for the observed differences between 
people in young adulthood and those in midlife. But even so, how to explain that old age 
was found to be associated with the most sustained SWB declines following disability 
onset? One plausible explanation may lie in the presence of normative age-related effects, 
as lifespan developmental research has shown that SWB tends to decline with age (e.g., 
Mroczek & Spiro, 2005; Vogel et al., 2013). However, in their study of disability-related 
changes in life satisfaction, Anusic et al. (2014) demonstrated that disability onset is 
uniquely associated with declines in life satisfaction, over and above age-related declines 
in life satisfaction over time. Disabled participants were found to report lower life 
satisfaction even many years after disability-onset, compared to where they would have 
been if they had not had a disability. Positive affect and negative affect were not 
assessed, but there is no reason to suspect that they would yield different result. 
 
A more likely explanation for our surprising finding may be that disability 
onset precipitates tertiary aging processes—that is, physical and cognitive changes that 
are associated with impending death (rather than with aging) (Birren and Cunningham, 
 
1985). Evidence has been accumulating to show that psychological (including well-
being) development is influenced by the dying process and that, in fact, the dying process 
has stronger (negative) effects on SWB than the aging process (e.g., Gerstorf et al., 2010; 
Palgi et al., 2010). This is in line with research postulating a systematic breakdown of 
psychological adaptation in the fourth age (85 years and older)—when functioning in 
most domains reaches its lowest limits—eventually resulting in the so-called 
phenomenon of “psychological mortality,” characterized by loss of identity, 
psychological autonomy, intentionality, sense of control, and dignity (Baltes & Smith, 
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2003). Thus, the lack of adaptation to disability onset of people in old age may be driven 
by mortality-related mechanisms. 
 
Alternatively, it is possible that societal resources (such as rehabilitation services) 
account for the observed age-differential effects of disability onset. Most countries, 
including Australia, offer rehabilitation services to individuals who acquire, or are likely 
to acquire, a disability. However, it is not clear to what extent such services benefit 
people in old age. For example, a cursory search under “rehabilitation services for 
disabled persons” on Google revealed that the great majority of government-sponsored 
rehabilitation services offer either vocational or, at best, a combination of vocational and 
non-vocational help. As much as this makes sense as a strategy to reduce or keep to a 
minimum the societal cost of unemployment among people of disability, it also implies 
that older adults may have fewer resources available to help them manage their everyday 
life and live more independently. 
 
The Moderating Role of Type of Disability 
 
As hypothesized, our analyses revealed that individuals do differ in their 
responses to disability onset based on the type of disability they report having. In fact, 
type of disability was found to moderate not only immediate disability-related changes in 
SWB, but also long-term adaptation. This finding is important as it further clarifies the 
mixed results of previous examinations of the SWB-disability onset association 
(including the present study’s), by showing that it may the type of disability that is 
acquired, not acquiring a disability that results in long-lasting negative consequences for 
SWB. 
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Our hypothesis that psychological disability would be associated with the most 
substantial and the most sustained declines in SWB, followed by physical disability and 
sensory disability, however, was only partially supported. We found that individuals 
with psychological disability do tend to report the steepest declines in life satisfaction 
and positive affect and the steepest increase in negative affect the year when disability is 
first reported. In the years thereafter, though, their levels of life satisfaction, positive 
affect, and negative affect tend to bounce back, fully returning to baseline within five 
years of disability onset. Conversely, we found evidence that both physical disability and 
sensory disability are not associated with complete adaptation. Individuals with physical 
disability, on average, showed partial adaptation in terms of negative affect and no 
adaptation at all in terms of life satisfaction and positive affect. Individuals with sensory 
disability reported stable overall trajectories in both life satisfaction and negative affect 
but also a linear steady decline in positive affect starting the year of onset. 
 
These finding are surprising on at least two levels. First, previous empirical 
investigations of between-person differences in SWB by type of disability (Livneh et al., 
2014; Mehnert et al., 1990; Uppal, 2006) gave no indication that sensory disability would 
be found to result in more sustained declines in SWB than both physical and 
psychological disabilities. Second, the fact that physical, but not psychological disability, 
was found to be associated with only partial adaptation appears inconsistent with a large 
body of research on the impact of stigma on people with disability that suggests 
psychologically-disabled individuals elicit more stigmatizing responses than any other 
type of disability (e.g., Ditchman et al., 2013). 
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On the other hand, previous empirical investigations of between-person 
differences in SWB by type of disability were cross-sectional and, as such, could only 
provide information regarding levels of, not level changes (let alone rates of change) in 
SWB. What they revealed was that people with sensory disability tend to report higher 
levels of SWB compared to people with psychological disability and, to a lesser extent, 
those with physical disability. What the present study revealed is that sensory disability may 
well be associated with higher levels of SWB, but higher levels do not necessarily imply 
less negative changes (or greater adaptation). Indeed, we actually replicated cross-sectional 
findings. For all measures of SWB, we found that levels of SWB associated with sensory 
disability are conceptually higher than levels of SWB associated with the other two types of 
disability, especially psychological disability. Yet, for positive affect, we found that 
disability-related changes associated with sensory disability are more negative in the long 
run. 
 
A plausible explanation for this finding may be related to the fact that sensory 
disability has a particularly high potential to disrupt social interaction and the sources of 
positive affect that it affords. For example, “speech problems that cannot be corrected” 
and “hearing problems that cannot be corrected” can both create barriers to verbal 
communication, thus hindering mutual self-disclosure, which is a major source of 
intimacy and intimacy-related positive emotions. Similarly, “vision impairments that 
cannot be corrected” deprive people with this type of disability of the capacity to see 
others smile—a behavior that is well-known to induce positive affect, both directly and 
indirectly by triggering smiling expressions (Dimberg, Thunberg, & Elmehed, 2000). 
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Vision-related disabilities also cause people with this type of disability to cease 
driving, which increases the risk of social isolation. 
 
In a similar fashion, the present study does not run counter to the vast body of 
research suggesting that psychological disability elicits more stigmatizing responses than 
any other type of disability (e.g., Ditchman et al., 2013). Indeed, we found that 
psychologically-disabled individuals reported much lower levels of SWB than the other 
two disability groups. This finding is consistent with the results obtained by Uppal 
(2006) and Livneh et al. (2014) and leaves opens the possibility that stigmatizing 
attitudes and behaviors play a major role in shaping disabled people’ SWB. 
 
On the other hand, extending previous research, the present study revealed that 
psychologically-disabled people, on average, reported significantly more substantial 
declines in SWB immediately following disability onset than did people with physical 
disability but, unlike these latter, were able to return to baseline within 5 years of onset. 
This finding may be attributable to any number of reasons that require further 
investigation. One possibility is that people with psychological disability, unlike those 
with physical disability, benefit in some way from recognizing their disabled status. Our 
analyses revealed that psychological disability, unlike physical and sensory disabilities, 
was associated with declines in SWB even before disability onset. This may point to a 
shift in perspective, away from attributing the symptoms of psychological disability to 
one’s personality to attributing them to a “medical condition,” thus creating a sense of 
relief in the long-term. 
 
Another possibility is that that people with “disfigurement or deformity” might 
have driven the result. A recent longitudinal study that examined the trajectories of life 
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satisfaction over the first 5 years following medical treatment for traumatic spinal cord 
injury, burns, or inter-articular fractures (Hernandez et al., 2014) found that the burn 
sample had more functional ability than the other two groups but lower levels of life 
satisfaction. The authors interpreted the results as indicating that activity limitations have 
a lesser impact on the well-being of people with burns than do other factors, “such as 
stigma and body image” (p.189). Thus, it is possible that stigma affects people with 
“disfigurement or deformity” more so than it affects psychologically-disabled people, 
explaining why the physical-disability group in our sample, unlike the psychological-
disability group, never returned to baseline. 
 
Lastly, one fruitful avenue for future research would be to determine whether 
comparable results would be obtained if a different set of outcome variables was 
considered. For example, if physical functioning-related variables were used as 
outcomes, people with physical disability may be found to report even steeper declines 
in the year surrounding disability onset and, consequently, even slower rates of 
adaptation in the years thereafter. If so, this would substantiate our finding that people 
with physical disability are the most adversely affected by disability onset. 
 
Strengths, Limitations and Directions for Future Studies 
 
The present study was among the firsts in the literature on the SWB-disability 
relation to recognize the multi-dimensional nature of SWB (see Diener et al., 2003, for a 
comprehensive theoretical account of SWB). Most previous investigations of disability-
related changes in SWB focused on either the cognitive component of the construct (as 
measured by life satisfaction) or, less commonly, on its affective component, but not on 
both simultaneously. Moreover, Lucas (2007, Study 2), the only other study in this 
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literature (that we know of) to assess both cognitive well-being and affective well-being, 
operationalized this latter solely as psychological distress (as measured by the General 
Health Questionnaire; Golberg, 1992). The present study split the affective dimension of 
SWB into two sub-dimensions—positive affect and negative affect. This is of value 
because, from both a theoretical and a statistical perspective, positive affect and 
negative affect are not opposite ends of the same continuum but rather separate and 
distinct constructs, independent from one another (Diener et al., 2003). 
 
Further, the empirical literature on disability-related changes in SWB has been 
dominated by studies that are either cross-sectional or short-term longitudinal 
investigations that do not contain pre-disability-onset observations. The present study 
added to this literature by providing an investigation of much-needed, and fresh, long-
term prospective longitudinal data. The data being “fresh” (i.e., collected in the last 
decade) is important because, as several theories (e.g., the Disablement Process Model; 
Verbrugge & Jette, 1994) suggest, disability is a dynamic process shaped by a complex 
interplay of both biomedical and non-biomedical factors embedded in historical context. 
Thus, recent studies may yield significantly different findings from those conducted in 
the 1980s, 1990s, and even the early 2000s, due to factors related to historical timing and 
a more nuanced understanding of disability. 
 
The present study also built upon and extended the small body of prospective 
longitudinal research on the relation between disability and SWB. This body of research has 
not only been scarce, but also inconclusive—with some studies (e.g., Pagán-Rodríguez, 
2010; Powdthavee, 2009) finding that acquiring a disability tends to exert a strong but 
short-lived negative impact on SWB, and others (e.g., Infurna & Wiest, 2016; 
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Lucas, 2007) reporting evidence of long-lasting negative overall effects. The present 
study added to this literature by examining whether and how disability onset may 
differentially impact groups of individuals with differing characteristics (age at disability 
onset and type of disability). The results provided clarity to previous mixed finding by 
showing that it may be when disability is acquired and the type of disability that is 
acquired, not acquiring a disability that results in long-lasting negative consequences for 
SWB. 
 
Although this study had multiple strengths, including (but not limited to) its 
longitudinal prospective design, pre-disability-onset data, long duration of follow-up, 
large sample size, and multiple measures of subjective well-being, it also had some 
limitations. First, as with all prospective longitudinal studies, the data were correlational. 
Thus, we cannot say with complete certitude that the onset of disability caused the 
changes in subjective well-being that we observed (because we cannot be certain that all 
potentially confounding variables were controlled). Future studies should consider 
including potentially confounding variables that were not accounted for in this study. 
 
Second, as with most longitudinal studies, selective attrition may have added a 
degree of bias to our results. It is possible that individuals who stayed in the study 
differed in important ways from those who dropped out. Although our results cannot be 
accounted for by selective attrition, because they reflect within-person changes over time, 
it is possible that these within-person changes would not be observed in the individuals 
who discontinued participation. If so, our results may somewhat underestimate the effects 
of disability on SWB (because it is likely that participants who dropped out may have 
fared worse psychologically than those who continued participation). On the other hand, 
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we checked for duration of stay-in-study and found that, on average, participants stayed 
in the study for 6.94 years before and 7.94 years after the onset of disability (range: 1-15 
years before and 1-14 years after). This indicates that likelihood of participation in the 
study did not decrease following disability onset. Further, one of the important findings 
of this study is that there is substantial variability in the way people respond to disability. 
Thus, it is likely that data from individuals who dropped out of the study may have 
simply increased this variability. 
 
Third, as is always the case when relying on secondary data (i.e., pre-existing 
datasets), we had no control over the study design (e.g., the frequency of assessments, 
the content of the items assessing our variables of interest, the selection of variables to 
include in the surveys), and some aspects of it were not ideal. For example, the frequency 
of assessments may have led to biases in the results due to the loss of potentially 
important information. Because participants were assessed yearly, some amount of 
adaptation may have already occurred before the first post-onset assessment. If, for 
instance, a participant’s disability (e.g., blindness) resulted from an accident, his or her 
negative affect may have increased dramatically in the weeks following the event and 
may have rebounded substantially by the time disability was reported for the first time. 
In such case, our study may have underestimated the amount of adaptation that occurred. 
Further research is required to examine this possibility. 
 
Further research is also warranted to examine other potential moderators (and 
mediators) of the SWB-disability relation, including factors that may help explain the 
moderating influences of age at disability onset and type of disability. For example, 
future studies may benefit from focusing on societal resources (e.g., rehabilitation 
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services) for individuals who acquire, or are likely to acquire, a disability to examine 
whether they might differ by age at disability onset. It is possible that more 
rehabilitation services are available for individuals in young adulthood and midlife, to 
help them get reintegrated into society (e.g., participate in education and/or regain 
employment), than they are for older adults, especially those in long-term care. Given 
that one goal of the rehabilitation process is to improve quality of life (Rubin, Chan, & 
Thomas, 2003), availability of rehabilitation services may have an impact on subjective 
well-being and help explain age-differential effects. Similarly, future studies may want 
to investigate mechanisms through which type of disability was found to moderate 
disability-related changes in SWB. As mentioned earlier, one such candidate is stigma 
toward people with disability (including self-stigma and public stigma; Corrigan et al., 
2003). The extent to which persons with various disabilities internalize or reject public 
stigma is also an important consideration. Unfortunately, we were not able to explore 
any of these and similar questions because the relevant information was simply not 
available in our dataset. 
 
A fourth caveat of the present study, which may have biased the results, is that it 
did not include a control group of individuals without disability. Without comparing 
within-person changes in SWB of individuals with and individuals without disability, it is 
impossible to rule out the possibility that the observed declines in SWB in people with 
disability are not accounted for by normative age-related changes. Anusic et al. (2014), 
who did include such control group, found that disability is uniquely associated with 
declines in SWB, over and above age-related declines in SWB over time. Disabled 
participants were found to report lower life satisfaction even many years after disability- 
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onset, compared to where they would have been if they had not had a disability. We 
urge future researchers to replicate this finding, as well as to examine the potential 
effects of normative age-related changes vis-à-vis disability-related changes in positive 
affect and negative affect. 
 
Relatedly, selection biases may have affected our results. Specifically, it is 
possible that it was only those individuals who fared the worst psychologically who 
reported having a disability. If so, our results may underestimate the amount of 
adaptation that occurs (because our study did not include disabled individuals who did 
not report having a disability). We urge future researchers to consider assessing the 
presence of disability via multiple independent sources, including self-reports, 
informant-reports, and official certification (if available), to make sure data from all 
disabled participants are included in the analyses. 
 
Lastly, we note that our sample was representative of the Australian population. 
Thus, in (conceptually) replicating the finding by Lucas (2007), Anusic et al. (2014) and 
Infurna and Wiest (2016) that SWB is responsive to the onset of disability and that, in 
fact, disability onset can exert long-lasting (negative) effects on SWB, we provided 
further evidence that this effect is robust across countries. Nevertheless, we also note two 
caveats. First, Australia, from which our sample was drawn, and Germany, Switzerland, 
and the U.K., from which the previous studies’ samples were drawn, are all OECD 
countries. Thus, we urge researchers to test the generalizability of this finding in samples 
representative of non-OECD countries’ populations. Second, as discussed earlier, our 
study also revealed what appear to be country differences in the way people respond to 
disability. Therefore, we encourage future researchers to conduct cross-cultural research 
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to confirm the existence of these differences and explore what specific cultural factors 
might account for them. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The present study aimed to advance the current understanding of the relation 
between subjective well-being and disability by examining (a) the extent to which 
different facets of SWB change as a function of disability onset and (b) how such 
changes differ by age at disability onset and by type of disability. The results showed that 
not all three facets of subjective well-being are equally sensitive to the onset of disability. 
More importantly, they replicated the finding that there are substantial differences in the 
way people respond to the onset of disability, and showed that some of these differences 
are accounted for by age at disability onset and by type of disability. Specifically, 
individuals who acquire disability in old age and physically-disabled individuals tend to 
be the most adversely affected by the onset of disability, their ability to return to baseline 
levels of SWB being significantly impaired compared to that of individuals who acquire 
disability in young adulthood and midlife and that of individuals with sensory or 
psychological disability, respectively. Future studies should test the generalizability of 
these findings and investigate the mechanisms underlying the moderating effects of age at 
disability onset and type of disability. 
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Table 1 
 
Inter-correlations, means, and standard deviations of the variables of interest (N = 
 
3,795).  
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 
1. Age at disability 
__ 
        
 
 
onset 
        
 
          
 
2. Physical disability -.001* __        
 
3. Sensory disability .21** -.68** __       
 
4. Psychological 
-.22** -.56** -.22** __ 
     
 
 
disability 
     
 
          
 
5. Gender (woman) -.004 .06** -.18** .12** __     
 
6. Marital status 
.13** .05** .05** -.13** -.08** __ 
   
 
 
(married) 
   
 
          
 
7. Education level 
-.02** .01* .003 -.02** -.11** .14** __ 
  
 
 
(high school) 
  
 
          
 
8. Income -.19** .02** .01* -.05** -.22** .13** .26** __  
 
9. Reliable comfort .08** .06** .02** -.11** .06** .10** .05** .04** __ 
 
 M 50.22 62.42% 20.69% 16.89% 51.45% 68.24% 56.58% 34,254 4.27 
 
 SD 17.40       45,991 1.29 
 
 
Range 16-99 
      0- 
0-6 
 
       819,503 
  
 
*p < .05 **p < .01. 
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Table 2 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Life Satisfaction in Relation to Disability Onset (N = 3,795).  
 
 Time to/from 
Number of 
  
 
 
disability onset M SD   
observations   
(years) 
  
 
    
 
 -15 245 7.88 1.69 
 
 -14 504 7.93 1.55 
 
 -13 753 7.91 1.64 
 
 -12 1009 7.92 1.57 
 
 -11 1200 7.97 1.53 
 
 -10 1363 8.01 1.47 
 
 -9 1554 7.95 1.46 
 
 -8 1748 7.90 1.51 
 
 -7 1920 7.94 1.43 
 
 -6 2127 7.95 1.43 
 
 -5 2439 7.89 1.47 
 
 -4 2743 7.92 1.46 
 
 -3 3069 7.94 1.43 
 
 -2 3506 7.92 1.45 
 
 -1 3794 7.91 1.48 
 
 0 3794 7.73 1.58 
 
 1 3048 7.77 1.54 
 
 2 2407 7.80 1.45 
 
 3 1878 7.80 1.47 
 
 4 1377 7.76 1.47 
 
 5 1073 7.76 1.46 
 
 6 908 7.80 1.42 
 
 7 717 7.86 1.36 
 
 8 556 7.80 1.40 
 
 9 463 7.79 1.44 
 
 10 342 7.77 1.36 
 
 11 240 7.73 1.58 
 
 12 170 7.90 1.38 
 
 13 83 7.89 1.51 
  
Note. N = 3,795 participants provided 45,030 Life Satisfaction (LS) observations for the 
period starting 15 years before disability onset and ending 13 years after disability onset. 
The average LS score was 7.87 (SD = 1.48). 
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Table 3 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Positive Affect in Relation to Disability Onset (N = 3,795)  
 
 Time to/from 
Number of 
  
 
 
disability onset M SD   
observations   
(years) 
  
 
    
 
 -15 235 4.10 1.05 
 
 -14 480 4.10 0.93 
 
 -13 716 4.17 0.99 
 
 -12 969 4.12 1.00 
 
 -11 1139 4.15 0.97 
 
 -10 1283 4.12 0.96 
 
 -9 1458 4.08 0.99 
 
 -8 1639 4.09 0.95 
 
 -7 1803 4.06 0.98 
 
 -6 2016 4.03 0.99 
 
 -5 2288 4.01 0.99 
 
 -4 2566 4.04 1.00 
 
 -3 2902 3.99 1.00 
 
 -2 3278 4.01 0.99 
 
 -1 3565 3.98 1.02 
 
 0 3784 3.80 1.06 
 
 1 2890 3.87 1.05 
 
 2 2274 3.86 1.05 
 
 3 1756 3.88 1.04 
 
 4 1271 3.87 1.06 
 
 5 990 3.86 1.09 
 
 6 827 3.85 1.05 
 
 7 658 3.88 1.08 
 
 8 510 3.88 1.08 
 
 9 423 3.86 1.09 
 
 10 310 3.90 1.06 
 
 11 213 3.85 1.12 
 
 12 153 3.86 1.08 
 
 13 75 3.87 1.10 
  
Note. N = 3,795 participants provided 42,471 Positive Affect (PA) observations for the 
period starting 15 years before disability onset and ending 13 years after disability onset. 
The average PA score was 3.97 (SD = 1.02). 
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Table 4 
 
Descriptive Statistics for Negative Affect in Relation to Disability Onset (N = 3,795)  
 
 Time to/from 
Number of 
  
 
 
disability onset M SD   
observations   
(years) 
  
 
    
 
 -15 235 2.40 0.87 
 
 -14 479 2.30 0.80 
 
 -13 716 2.26 0.85 
 
 -12 970 2.25 0.83 
 
 -11 1138 2.31 0.86 
 
 -10 1284 2.29 0.83 
 
 -9 1456 2.32 0.85 
 
 -8 1639 2.32 0.84 
 
 -7 1801 2.31 0.83 
 
 -6 2017 2.32 0.85 
 
 -5 2288 2.32 0.84 
 
 -4 2566 2.32 0.85 
 
 -3 2903 2.33 0.85 
 
 -2 3281 2.34 0.86 
 
 -1 3567 2.37 0.89 
 
 0 3787 2.49 0.94 
 
 1 2890 2.41 0.92 
 
 2 2274 2.39 0.89 
 
 3 1755 2.38 0.91 
 
 4 1271 2.37 0.90 
 
 5 988 2.36 0.89 
 
 6 826 2.38 0.89 
 
 7 658 2.34 0.87 
 
 8 510 2.33 0.90 
 
 9 422 2.33 0.91 
 
 10 310 2.31 0.84 
 
 11 211 2.38 0.95 
 
 12 152 2.34 0.88 
 
 13 75 2.37 0.87 
  
Note. N = 3,795 participants provided 42,469 Negative Affect (NA) observations for the 
period starting 15 years before disability onset and ending 13 years after disability onset. 
The average NA score was 2.35 (SD = 0.88). 
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Table 5 
 
Changes in Life Satisfaction, Positive Affect, and Negative Affect Before and After 
Disability Onset  
 
 Life Satisfaction  Positive Affect  Negative Affect 
Fixed effects Estimate (SE)  Estimate (SE)  Estimate (SE) 
Intercept γ00 7.78** (.02) 3.83**(.02) 2.44** (.01) 
Pre, γ10 -0.01* (.003) -0.01** (.002) -0.003 (.001) 
Reaction, γ20 -0.15** (.02) -0.13** (.01) 0.10** (.01) 
Post, γ30 0.01* (.004) 0.002 (.003) -0.01** (.002) 
Random effects       
Intercept, u0i 1.29** (.04) 0.72**(.02) 0.55** (.02) 
Pre, u1i 0.01** (.001) 0.003** (.0002) 0.002** (.0001) 
Reaction, u2i 0.35** (.03) 0.17**(.01) 0.13** (.01) 
Post, u3i 0.01** (.001) 0.004**(.001) 0.003** (.0003) 
Covariance, u0i u1i 0.03** (.004) 0.02** (.002) 0.01** (.001) 
Covariance, u0i u2i 0.20** (.03) 0.10**(.01) 0.09** (.01) 
Covariance, u0i u3i -0.04** (.01) 0.001 (.003) -0.01* (.002) 
Covariance, u1i u2i -0.01 (.004) -0.004 (.001) -0.002 (.001) 
Covariance, u1i u3i -0.004** (.001) -0.001 (.0004) -0.0002 (.0003) 
Covariance, u2i u3i -0.0003 (.01) -0.0001 (.002) -0.002 (.002) 
Residual variance 0.92** (.01) 0.39** (.003) 0.29** (.002) 
Fit statistics       
-2 Log Likelihood 131288.5 95410.7 83101.9 
AIC 131318.5 95440.7 83131.9 
BIC 131412.1 95534.3 83225.5 
Note: * p < .005 **p < .0001. 
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Table 6 
 
The Effect of Age at Disability Onset on Changes in Life Satisfaction, Positive Affect, and 
Negative Affect Before and After Disability Onset  
 
 Life Satisfaction  Positive Affect  Negative Affect 
Fixed effects Estimate (SE)  Estimate (SE)  Estimate (SE) 
Intercept γ00 7.64** (.03) 3.80** (.02) 2.39** (.02) 
Age, γ01 0.16** (.001) 0.05** (.001) -0.14** (.001) 
Age2, γ02 0.05** (.0001) 0.01 (.00004) 0.01 (.00004) 
Pre, γ10 -0.0003 (.004) -0.01** (.002) -0.01** (.002) 
Pre × age, γ11 0.01** (.0001) 0.01** (.0001) -0.003* (.0001) 
Pre × age2, γ12 -0.004** (.00) -0.002** (.00) 0.002** (.00) 
Reaction, γ20 -0.11** (.03) -0.12** (.02) 0.08** (.01) 
Reaction × age, γ21 0.01 (.001) -0.004 (.001) -0.02 (.001) 
Reaction × age2, γ22 -0.01 (.0001) -0.001 (.00004) 0.003 (.00003) 
Post slope, γ30 0.03** (.006) 0.01 (.004) -0.02** (.003) 
Post × age, γ31 -0.01 (.0003) -0.01** (.0001) 0.01** (.0001) 
Post × age2, γ32 -0.01** (.0001) -0.003* (.00) 0.002* (.00) 
Random effects      
Intercept, u0i 1.17** (.03) 0.78** (.03) 0.51** (.02) 
Pre, u1i 0.01** (.001) 0.003** (.0002) 0.002** (.0001) 
Reaction, u2i 0.34** (.03) 0.22** (.02) 0.15** (.01) 
Post, u3i 0.01** (.001) 0.01** (.001) 0.01** (.001) 
Covariance, u0i u1i 0.03** (.004) 0.03** (.002) 0.01** (.001) 
Covariance, u0i u2i 0.20** (.02) -0.14** (.02) -0.09** (.01) 
Covariance, u0i u3i -0.03** (.01) -0.03** (.004) -0.02** (.003) 
Covariance, u1i u2i -0.01* (.004) -0.01** (.002) -0.01** (.001) 
Covariance, u1i u3i -0.004** (.001) -0.003** (.0004) -0.002** (.0003) 
Covariance, u2i u3i -0.001 (.005) 0.02** (.003) 0.01** (.002) 
Residual variance 0.92** (.01) 0.39** (.003) 0.29** (.002) 
Fit statistics      
-2 Log Likelihood 130793.0 95231.8 82499.7 
AIC 130839.0 95277.8 82545.7 
BIC 130982.6 95421.3 82689.2 
Note: * p < .005 **p < .0001. 
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Table 7 
 
The Effect of Type of Disability on Changes in Life Satisfaction, Positive Affect, and 
Negative Affect Before and After Disability Onset  
 
 Life Satisfaction  Positive Affect  Negative Affect 
Fixed effects Estimate (SE)  Estimate (SE)  Estimate (SE) 
Intercept, γ00 7.79** (.03) 3.84** (.02) 2.39** (.02) 
Sensory, γ01 0.34** (.05) 0.31** (.04) -0.25** (.03) 
Psychological, γ02 -0.48** (.06) -0.44** (.04) 0.58** (.03) 
Physical, γ03 0 0 0 
Pre, γ10 -0.01 (.004) -0.01** (.002) -0.004 (.002) 
Pre × sensory, γ11 0.002 (.01) 0.01 (.004) -0.003 (.003) 
Pre × psychological, γ12 -0.02* (.01) -0.01* (.01) 0.01* (.004) 
Pre × physical, γ13 0 0 0 
Reaction, γ20 -0.14** (.02) -0.14** (.02) 0.10** (.01) 
Reaction × sensory, γ21 0.11* (.05) 0.11* (.03) -0.07* (.03) 
Reaction × psychological, γ22 -0.16* (.05) -0.08 (.04) 0.13** (.03) 
Reaction × physical, γ23 0 0 0 
Post, γ30 0.002 (.01) 0.002 (.004) -0.01* (.003) 
Post × sensory, γ31 -0.01 (.01) -0.03* (.01) 0.02 (.01) 
Post × psychological, γ32 0.08** (.01) 0.04** (.01) -0.04** (.01) 
Post × physical, γ33 0 0 0 
Random effects      
Intercept, u0i 1.23** (.04) 0.67** (.02) 0.48** (.01) 
Pre, u1i 0.01** (.001) 0.003** (.0002) 0.002** (.0001) 
Reaction, u2i 0.34** (.03) 0.17** (.01) 0.13** (.01) 
Post, u3i 0.01** (.001) 0.004** (.001) 0.003** (.0003) 
Covariance, u0i u1i 0.03** (.004) 0.02** (.002) 0.01** (.001) 
Covariance, u0i u2i 0.18** (.03) 0.09** (.01) 0.08** (.01) 
Covariance, u0i u3i -0.03** (.01) 0.01 (.002) -0.001 (.002) 
Covariance, u1i u2i -0.01* (.004) -0.004* (.001) -0.002 (.001) 
Covariance, u1i u3i -0.004** (.001) -0.0003 (.0003) -0.0001 (.0003) 
Covariance, u2i u3i 0.00003 (.01) 0.0001 (.002) -0.002 (.002) 
Residual variance 0.92** (.007) 0.39** (.003) 0.29** (.002) 
Fit statistics      
-2 Log Likelihood 131092.2 95080.1 82591.6 
AIC 131138.2 95126.1 82637.6 
BIC 131281.7 95269.7 82781.1 
 
Note: Individuals affected by physical disability were used as the reference group in this 
model.  
* p < .005 **p < .0001. 
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Table 8 
 
Changes in Life Satisfaction, Positive Affect, and Negative Affect Before and After 
Disability Onset as Predicted by Age at Disability Onset, Type of Disability, Socio-
Demographic Characteristics and Reliable Comfort.  
 
  Life  Positive  Negative 
  Satisfaction  Affect  Affect 
Fixed effects  Estimate (SE)  Estimate (SE)  Estimate (SE) 
Intercept, γ00 7.70** (.04) 3.75** (.03) 2.42** (.03) 
Age, γ01 0.11** (.001) 0.01 (.001) -0.10** (.001) 
Age2, γ02 0.06** (.0001) 0.01* (.00004) 0.002 (.00004) 
Sensory, γ03 0.22** (.01) 0.27** (.04) -0.14** (.03) 
Psychological, γ04 -0.26** (.05) -0.32** (.04) 0.37** (.03) 
Physical, γ05 0 0 0 
Gender, γ06 -0.01 (.04) 0.17** (.03) -0.21** (.02) 
Gender(F), γ07 0 0 0 
Educ., γ08 0.05 (.004) -0.04 (.03) 0.04 (.02) 
Educ.(HS), γ09 0 0 0 
Income(0), γ010 0.02 (.05) -0.01 (.04) 0.02 (.03) 
Income(1), γ011 0.01 (.01) 0.01 (.04) -0.007 (.03) 
Income(2), γ012 0 0 0 
Married, γ013 -0.38** (.04) -0.06 (.03) 0.06* (.03) 
Married(Yes), γ014 0 0 0 
Reliable comfort, γ015 0.30** (.01) 0.01** (.01) -0.21** (.01) 
Pre, γ10 0.003 (.01) -0.01** (.004) -0.01 (.003) 
Pre × age, γ11 0.01** (.0002) 0.004* (.0001) -0.001 (.0001) 
Pre × age2, γ12 -0.004** (.00) -0.003** (.00) 0.002** (.00) 
Pre × sensory, γ13 0.0003 (.01) 0.01 (.004) -0.004 (.003) 
Pre × psychological, γ14 -0.02* (.01) -0.01 (.004) 0.01* (.004) 
Pre × physical, γ15 0 0 0 
Pre × gender, γ16 0.0001 (.006) 0.001 (.003) -0.001 (.003) 
Pre × gender(F), γ17 0 0 0 
Pre × education, γ18 -0.01* (0.01) -0.002 (.003) -0.0004 (.003) 
Pre × education(HS), γ19 0 0 0 
Pre × income(0), γ110 0.001 (.01) 0.007 (.004) -0.01 (.004) 
Pre × income(1), γ111 0.02* (.01) 0.02* (.01) -0.001 (.004) 
Pre × income(2), γ112 0 0 0 
Pre × married, γ113 0.002 (.01) 0.002 (.004) -0.01* (.003) 
Pre × married(Yes), γ114 0 0 0 
Pre × reliable comfort, γ115 0.01* (.002) 0.01** (.001) -0.01** (.001) 
Reaction, γ20 -0.04 (.04) -0.08* (.03) 0.07* (.02) 
Reaction × age, γ21 -0.01 (.001) -0.02 (.001) -0.003 (.001) 
Reaction × age2, γ22 -0.001 (.0001) 0.003 (.00004) -0.0003 (.00) 
Reaction × sensory, γ23 0.12* (.05) 0.11* (.03) -0.06* (.03) 
Reaction × psychological, γ24 -0.14* (.05) -0.08* (.04) 0.10* (.03) 
Reaction × physical, γ25 0 0 0 
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Reaction × gender, γ26 -0.08* (.04) -0.02 (.03) -0.01 (.02) 
Reaction × gender (F), γ27 0 0 0 
Reaction × education, γ28 0.03 (.04) -0.04 (.03) 0.002 (.02) 
Reaction × education (HS), 0 0 0 
γ29    
Reaction × income(0), γ210 -0.05 (.05) -0.04 (.03) 0.004 (.03) 
Reaction × income(1), γ211 -0.15** (.06) -0.09* (.04) 0.01 (.01) 
Reaction × income(2), γ212 0 0 0 
Reaction × married, γ213 -0.07 (.04) -0.03 (.03) 0.08* (.02) 
Reaction × married(Yes), γ214 0 0 0 
Reaction × reliable comfort, 0.03* (.01) 0.03* (.01) -0.03* (.01) 
γ215    
Post, γ30 0.02 (.01) 0.01 (.01) -0.02** (.01) 
Post × age, γ31 -0.0004 (.0003) -0.005* (.0002) 0.01* (.0002) 
Post × age2, γ32 -0.01* (.00001) -0.003* (.00) 0.002* (.00) 
Post ×sensory, γ33 -0.007 (.01) -0.02* (.007) 0.01 (.006) 
Post × psychological, γ34 0.08** (.01) 0.04** (.01) -0.03** (.01) 
Post × physical, γ35 0 0 0 
Post × gender, γ36 -0.01 (.01) -0.01 (.01) 0.01 (.01) 
Post × gender(F), γ37 0 0 0 
Post × education, γ38 -0.02** (.01) -0.01 (.006) 0.01 (.01) 
Post × education (HS), γ39 0 0 0 
Post × income(0), γ310 -0.007 (.01) -0.004 (.01) 0.01 (.01) 
Post × income(1), γ311 -0.01 (.01) 0.0004 (.01) 0.004 (.01) 
Post × income(2), γ312 0 0 0 
Post × married, γ313 0.03** 0.01* (.007) -0.01* (.01) 
Post × married(Yes), γ314 0 0 0 
Post × reliable comfort, γ315 -0.002 (.003) -0.01* (.002) 0.01* (.002) 
Random effects    
Intercept, u0i 0.95** (.03) 0.57** (.02) 0.36** (.01) 
Pre, u1i 0.01** (.001) 0.003** (.0002) 0.002** (.0001) 
Reaction, u2i 0.34** (.03) 0.17** (.01) 0.12** (.01) 
Post, u3i 0.01** (.001) 0.004** (.0004) 0.003** (.0003) 
Covariance, u0i u1i 0.03** (.003) 0.01** (.001) 0.01** (.001) 
Covariance, u0i u2i 0.16** (.02) 0.08** (.01) 0.06** (.01) 
Covariance, u0i u3i -0.02** (.004) 0.01* (.002) 0.003* (.002) 
Covariance, u1i u2i -0.01* (.003) -0.004* (.001) -0.003* (.001) 
Covariance, u1i u3i -0.004** (.001) -0.0004 (.0004) -0.0001 (.0003) 
Covariance, u2i u3i 0.001 (.01) -0.0002 (.002) -0.002 (.002) 
Residual variance 0.92** (.007) 0.39** (.003) 0.29** (.002) 
Fit statistics    
-2 Log Likelihood 130003.0 94340.8 81400.0 
AIC 130113.0 94450.9 81510.6 
BIC 130456.3 94794.1 81853.3 
 
Note: Gender = Male. Gender(F) = Female. Education = Less than high school. 
Education(HS): At least high school. Income(0) = Average annual household income of 
AU$0. Income(1) = Average annual household income of up to AU$29,000. Income(2)= 
Average annual household income of AU$30,000 or more. Married = Unmarried. 
Married(Yes) – Married.  
* p < .005 **p < .0001. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
FIGURES 
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Figure 1. Model predicted changes in life satisfaction (a), positive affect (b), and negative 
affect (c) before and after disability onset. The red line in Figure 1a shows that life 
satisfaction, on average, declined in the period leading up to disability onset (Years -5 to -1), 
substantially dropped the year of onset (level change from Year -1 to Year 0) and then 
showed a tendency to bounce back (Years 1 to 5). Yet, even five years after onset, it 
continued to remain below its pre-onset value. The red lines in Figure 1b shows that average 
levels of positive affect decreased in the period preceding onset, substantially dropped the 
year of onset, and then stopped declining but did not rebound in the years thereafter. The red 
line in Figure 1c shows that negative affect, on average, remained stable in the period leading 
up to onset, increased significantly the year surrounding onset, and then showed a tendency 
to return toward baseline. However, the return (decrease) in the years following onset never 
brought levels of negative affect back to their pre-onset values. The grey lines depict 
predicted trajectories for a subset of 200 participants. They show that there were substantial 
between-person differences in level and rates of change in life satisfaction, positive affect, 
and negative affect before and after disability onset. 
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Figure 2. Graphical illustration of the moderating effect of age at disability onset on changes 
in life satisfaction (a), positive affect (b), and negative affect (c) before and after disability 
onset. The three colored lines represent young adulthood (30 years old; yellow), midlife (50 
years old; red), and old age (70 years old; green). The three age groups, on average, did not 
differ significantly in their initial response to disability onset; they all experienced an equally 
significant drop in life satisfaction (a) and positive affect (b) and increase in negative affect 
(c) the year they first reported having disability (level change from Year -1 to Year 0). 
However, in the years thereafter (Years 1 to 5), individuals in midlife showed a tendency to 
return to pre-onset levels of life satisfaction (a), positive affect (b), and negative affect (c). 
Young adults showed a tendency to return toward (but not to) baseline levels of life 
satisfaction (a), positive affect (b), and negative affect (c). Individuals in old age showed no 
such tendency; instead, they reported sustained lower levels of, and even a slight decline in, 
life satisfaction (a) and further declines in positive affect (b) and increases in negative affect 
(c). 
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Figure 3. Graphical illustration of the moderating effect of type of disability on changes in 
life satisfaction (a), positive affect (b), and negative affect (c) before and after disability 
onset. The blue line shows that sensory disability was associated with relative stability in life 
satisfaction (a) and negative affect (c) across the disability transition, but also with a steady 
linear decline in positive affect starting the year surrounding disability onset (b). The black 
line shows that physically-disabled individuals, on average, reported significant declines in 
life satisfaction (a) and positive affect (b) and a significant increase in negative affect (c) the 
year surrounding disability onset (level change from Year -1 to Year 0), followed by no signs 
of adaptation in the years thereafter, except for negative affect (c), which showed partial 
adaptation. The magenta line shows that individuals with psychological disability, on 
average, experienced the steepest declines in life satisfaction 
 
(a) and positive affect (b) and the steepest increase in negative affect (c) the year of 
onset, yet were able to recover completely (or almost completely) within 5 years of onset. 
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